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Originally the subject of the research was Software Defined Networking (SDN) and 
particularly the threats towards the architecture and the SDN controller. However, during 
the research, it became evident that the protocol under research, OpenFlow itself had 
features which may turn into threats under the hands of a malicious actor outside the SDN 
network. The features may have vulnerabilities that may transform into threats should an 
attacker gain access to the SDN network. 
The verification of possible threat scenarios regarding the OpenFlow protocol 
vulnerabilities varied from configuring the SDN network to managing the traffic flows in 
the solution. Diverse SDN solution vulnerabilities and threats aspects were studied; from 
the history to the state-of-art of the technique and from the analysis of SW vulnerabilities 
according to vulnerabilities database to threat mitigations. 
The verification was not done in simulated environment but in an actual SDN network 
running on virtual resources with OpenDaylight SDN controller along with Open vSwitch 
virtual networking devices.  
The administrative tasks in overall have the greatest role in providing security in the SDN 
solution. To protect the SDN solution and mitigate the vulnerabilities, the SDN network 
should be configured according to secure communication principles with TLS. In case of 
connection failure, the SDN switch should be configured to reconnect to SDN controller 
and resume networking according to flow table rules. Also, the OpenFlow protocol 
features enabling unsecure communication in the SDN network, for example missing 
parameters in the flow entries or disabling networking statistics to prevent the monitoring 
of the SDN networking traffic, should be undeniably disabled. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tutkimuksen alkuperäinen aihe oli SDN-arkkitehtuuriin ja SDN-kontrolleriin kohdistuvat 
kyberuhat. Nopeasti tutkimuksen edetessä huomattiin, että OpenFlow-protokolla SDN- 
ratkaisussa sisälsi haavoittuvuuksia. Haavoittuvuuksia voi muodostua pahansuovan 
käyttäjän vaarantaessa SDN-ratkaisun kyberturvallisuuden hyökkäämällä sitä vastaan. 
Hyökkäyksen mahdollisuus avautuu SDN-verkkoa konfiguroitaessa ja vuotaulujen 
hallinnoinnin yhteydessä SDN OpenFlow -väylän komennoilla. 
Mahdollisten kyberuhkien varmistamiseen kuului SDN-verkon konfigurointi ja sen 
hallinnointi vuotaulujen avulla. Erilaisia katsantokantoja käyttäen tutkimusta tehtiin 
tutustumalla aikaisemmin havaittuihin haavoittuvuuksiin ja kyberuhkiin; siihen kuului SDN-
arkkitehtuurin historiaan ja nykyiseen tilanteeseen tutustumista sekä 
haavoittuvuustietokantojen läpikäymistä ja kyberuhkien lieventämisen teoriaa. 
Kyberuhkien varmistaminen tehtiin oikeassa SDN-verkossa, ei simuloimalla. SDN-verkko 
konfiguroitiin virtuaalisiin resursseihin käyttäen OpenDaylight SDN -kontrolleria ja Open 
vSwitch -kytkimiä. 
SDN-arkkitehtuurin hallinnollisilla toimilla voidaan varmistaa sen kyberturvallisuus. 
Suojatakseen SDN-arkkitehtuurin ja lieventämällä siihen kohdistuvia haavoittuvuuksia, 
SDN-verkon hallintaliikenne tulee suojata TLS:llä. Jos tietoliikenneyhteys SDN-kontrollerin 
ja kytkimen välillä katkeaa, sen pitäisi palautua automaattisesti takaisin toimintakuntoon. 
Kytkimen pitäisi jatkaa pakettien edelleenlähettämistä vuotaulujen sääntöjen mukaisesti. 
Suojaamattomien toiminnallisuuksien käyttäminen, kuten tiettyjen parametrien 
määrittelemättä jättäminen vuotaulujen hallinnoinnissa ja SDN-tietoliikenteen 
monitoroinnin poistaminen käytöstä, pitäisi estää SDN-arkkitehtuurissa. 
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Terms and Definitions 
CAM Content Addressable Memory. 
Flow rule  An entry in a flow table with traffic forwarding instructions. 
Flow table A collection of traffic forwarding rules. 
SDN Software-Defined Networking 
SDI Software-Defined Infrastructure 
SDx Software-Defined Everything 
NBI North Bound Interface 
NFV Network Function Virtualization 
SBI South Bound Interface 
ODL OpenDaylight 
ODL Controller Open Daylight SDN Controller. Manages OpenFlow switches. 
OpenFlow SDN protocol standard for managing switches remotely from an 
SDN controller. 
Open vSwitch  OpenFlow protocol compliant virtual switch for SDN architecture. 
Ovs-ofctl Command line interface on Open vSwitch virtual switch 
supporting and implementing OpenFlow protocol and its API. 
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1 Introduction 
This master’s thesis studies the threats towards the SDN architecture. The scope is 
especially in the possible OpenFlow protocol vulnerabilities which may be taken advantage 
of during the configuration of the SDN network and managing the traffic flows inside the 
SDN solution. The protocol vulnerabilities are discussed in detail in chapter 3.2 OpenFlow 
Protocol Weaknesses. Before going to the details of the protocol threats, a look back in 
history is taken on how the networking has evolved in the past two decades. 
There has been a need for deploying and managing networks in an efficient and centralized 
way already in the traditional networks. The traditional networks have characteristics of 
being vendor-locked, proprietary and scattered, especially from the management point-of-
view. The remedy for this puzzle was already drafted 20 years ago, in the minds of 
revolutionary researchers (Wetherall, Guttag & Tennenhouse 1998, 1). At the time, the 
technological enablers were however missing (Feamster, Rexford & Zegura 2013, 5). The 
essence in the programmable networks is that networking resources are available via a 
programming interface. The interface, API, enables network management programmatically 
instead of complex physical changes and configurations (Feamster et al. 2013, 2 - 3). The 
details of programmable networks are highlighted in chapter 2.1 Brief History of SDN. 
The programmable networks fit in the picture of today’s networking needs again, as an easy 
and bundled way of managing networks from a centralized center. The technology trends 
form an overall digital mesh. Everything will be connected. The IoT and sensors augment 
the digital mesh (Gartner Top 10 Technology Trends 2016, 2016). These technology needs 
require more from the networking in connecting the resources together. The solution to 
the needs is virtualized, and shared resources such as cloud solutions are managed with the 
SDN architecture. 
The malicious attackers have emerged in the networks connecting users, devices, sensors, 
services, information, data etc. The attackers have diverse reasons and motivation to 
attack. The attackers’ objective is often in the financial gain, or they just may have malicious 
intents. Intelligence is another substantial cause for a cyber attack. (Slavov, Miche & 
Schneider 2016, 9.) 
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In the context of this master’s thesis, a selection of threats is chosen to be verified. The 
selection is made according to Slavov et al. (2016, 22 - 34) considerations for the SDN 
specific threats. The document has identified different threats that range from the flow 
table manipulation to the network performance degradation. In between there are attacks 
via the forwarding plane, control network threats, i.e. the Southbound Interface (SBI) 
targeted attacks and attacks via the Northbound Interface (NBI). The research also 
discusses threats via virtualized environments and breach of domain isolation; however, 
those are not specifically addressed in this research. Nevertheless, the testbed for 
verification is entirely built in virtual resources since there may be some findings regarding 
that type of threats. 
One interesting idea to verify is if it is possible to compromise the SDN controller via a 
virtual switch when asking for the flow table rules from it. Can the Data plane be 
compromised from a virtual switch? Also, it would be excellent to find and experiment with 
novel threats. 
In addition to exploring the vulnerabilities in the SDN architecture, the threat landscape for 
the services running on the SDN orchestrated networks is drawn to understand cyber 
security. Also, an attacker mindset understanding is built to be used in ethical hacking. 
1.1 Client 
The client of this master’s thesis is Nokia Bell Labs, and its organization Security 
Technologies.  Security Technologies focus on research and standardization regarding the 
security technologies. The research topics are among others in SDN, machine learning and 
trusted boot. 
This master’s thesis and its results will provide input to Digile’s DIMECC Cyber Trust project 
(DIMECC Cyber Trust Program n.d.). Cyber Trust is a consortium of industrial and research 
organizations collaborating in Security Technologies and Secure Management for Future 
Technologies project.  
DIGILE is a non-profit company operating between the public and private 
sectors with the goal of increasing know-how and developing the tools 
required by the Internet economy – and creating growth, jobs and new 
business in Finland through it. (Digile, about us 2016.) 
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Cyber Trust project was set in motion as a major change in network architectures, protocols 
and management is expected. The change of networking architecture is expected to be 
based on the SDN and NFV. These architectures enable flexible provisioning, operation and 
management of the entire networking system securely. New business possibilities are also 
expected: e.g. multitenancy in data centers, which enables multiple tenants in the same 
SDN network to function in their own isolated network segments. (Cyber Trust Project Plan 
2016, 1 – 3.) This brings scalability and green values to the networking in the form of 
deploying more resources based on the need and sharing the same resources with other 
tenants to allow scalability. Both the service provider and the tenant benefit from the 
solution as resources are optimally used with minimum and optimal investments. (What is 
SDN? n.d., chapter Benefits of SDN.) 
Cyber Trust project’s goals that are addressed in this master’s thesis are related to SDN 
architecture security issues. The threat verification based on the Cyber Trust Threats 
document and possible new threats is expected to give input for continuous improvement 
of the project related testbed. 
1.2 Parties Involved in the Research 
The industrial organizations involved in the Cyber Trust project are Elisa Oyj, Nokia 
Networks, Nokia Bell Labs and Oy L M Ericsson Ab. Elisa Oyj has a project role as a business 
case coordinator and as a provider of mobile network B2B services. Nokia Networks and 
Nokia Bell Labs have an infrastructure provider role with a business interest especially in 
SDN and NFV. Oy L M Ericsson Ab has an interest as an infrastructure provider in the 
research of the new network challenges. (Cyber Trust Project Plan 2016, 7.) 
The main research organizations involved in the project are Aalto University and JAMK 
University of Applied Sciences (JAMK). Aalto University acts as an academic research 
partner. JAMK’s role is to act as a coordinator and a research partner that provides test bed 
hosting in the Realistic Global Cybersecurity Environment (RGCE). More information on the 
RGCE in chapter 4.2 Resources Needed in Verification. JYU (University of Jyväskylä), 
University of Oulu, Oulu Business School, University of Helsinki are in the supporting role in 
the business case. (Cyber Trust Project Plan 2016, 7.) 
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Digile’s other services are related to the IoT Management (Digile IoT Management n.d.), 
Data to Intelligence (DIMECC Data to Intelligence n.d.) and Need for Speed (Digile Need for 
Speed n.d.). The IoT Management project description is following; 
Networking and Management research area aims solve technical issues which 
are important for the IoT above the physical networking layer. The important 
architecture issues include the infrastructure for device bootstrapping, end to 
end connectivity, monitoring and control capabilities. Also, in the research 
area we consider the infrastructure for network management and 
configuration, security, and object identification and discovery. (Digile IoT 
Management n.d.) 
The Data to Intelligence, D2I, handles big data, data processing technologies and user 
centric application in the security and customer intelligence to name a few of the seven 
project targets (DIMECC Data to Intelligence n.d.). 
The Need for Speed, N4S, project concentrates on 
Digital resources are constantly available on-line, and for all to use. 
Increasingly, products and services are not developed by a single company but 
rather by a network of collaborating companies. This network of companies 
contributes to the ecosystem through different elements from both established 
and newly developed products, forming new, even more compelling offerings. 
(Digile Need for Speed n.d.) 
1.3 Client Use Cases 
The client’s main use case is for Data Centers (DC) providing Cloud services implemented 
with the SDN architecture. The DC solution may serve as a high-performance computing 
resource or as a web server. The high-performance computing resource can process Big 
Data efficiently. The Web server can provide a versatile platform for changing web usage 
and page creation: Web2.0 services for active web usage as opposed to previous passive 
content viewing like in the Web1.0 (Cormode & Krishnamurthy 2008, chapter 1 
Introduction). The Semantic Web, Web3.0, would also benefit from the scalable and flexible 
networking. The SDN network may provide resources for data collecting processing power 
and data sharing (Dokulil, Tykal, Yaghob & Zavoral 2007, 1). The data processing especially 
requires scalable resources as it needs to find relations, i.e. interoperability between an 
actor, an event and for example, a location filtered with actor’s common and unique 
preferences related to those variables (Shadbolt, Hall & Berners-Lee 2006, 1). The essence 
of semantic theory is “the logical connection of terms (that) establishes interoperability 
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between systems.” (Shadbolt et al. 2006, 1.) The processing of the gathered metadata and 
its output data is then relocated to suitable applications in the relevant devices (Dokulil et 
al. 2007, 2). 
As learned earlier in chapter 1.1 Client the benefits in using the SDN architecture in Data 
Center (DC) solutions enable resource scaling by adding new virtual servers for better 
availability. When using the SDN, vendors cannot dictate to using their HW, configurations 
or protocols in the network management nor is the user bound to previous or future 
vendor solutions. This brings flexibility, cost savings, compatibility and freedom for the DC 
and related networking management. 
Also, chapter 1.1 Client presents benefits for the SDN architecture tenant (e.g. a Cloud 
customer) in the form of scalability, cost reductions and green value add. According to the 
resource needs, a tenant can request scaling for the resources used. This is one part of the 
cost reductions as well as provision and de-provisioning of the resources according to the 
peak-times charged per usage i.e. pay-per-cost. The other cost reductions can be gained as 
no massive IT HW investments are no longer needed. As massive IT HW investments are not 
needed, the IT HW operational and the maintenance costs lower accordingly. By sharing the 
IT HW resources of the Cloud service provider green value is added to the tenant as well.  
1.4 Trend Threat Considerations 
The Internet of Things (IoT) attached devices will require vast numbers of authentication 
services/servers when used in a secure manner (Lyne 2015, 2). The services are assumed to 
be running in the SDN operated resources. An attacker would try to compromise the 
authentication process to gain access to an IoT device. A compromised authentication 
service/server could lead to exploiting another trend threat, gaining access to personal 
records. (Lyne 2015, 2.) The personal records can be used as a negotiation advance in a 
ransomware scenario (Our Cybersecurity Predictions for 2016, 2015). The ransomware type 
of threats can be caused by an unpatched SW version in the target. 
A web server could be running on the SDN orchestrated system. The web application 
threats enlarge the threat landscape significantly. As personal records are the threat trend 
target, the web server patching creates vulnerabilities which can enable injections, 
especially Cross-site Scripting, XSS, injection which can enable file and resource extraction 
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(OWASP Top 10, 9). In addition to the server patching, also plugins in browsers and servers 
(Content Management Servers, CMS, especially) enlarge the attack surface (Content 
Management Systems Security and Associated Risks 2013). 
People may encounter spear-phishing as it is trending (Internet Security Threat Report 
2016, 6) as well but how about the industry personnel’s cyber security skills? The personal 
and human aspects require being on one’s guard about the suspicious unknown content 
wedging from all around. There is a need for everybody to take responsibility in setting up 
and maintaining security and keeping up the security intelligence in the area (Op. cit. 47).  
1.5 Practical Benefits 
The research in this master’s thesis context identifies the threats which hopefully help in 
finding possible flaws in the SDN architecture. The identified mitigations based on the 
verification results will help in preventing the threats from the user point-of-view in 
orchestrating the networking functions. For the developers, the usefulness may come in the 
form of using the threat findings as possible maintenance or security hardening ideas in the 
implementation phase. All these aspects come down to protecting the ICT security in all its 
aspects: authentication, integrity, confidentiality, authorization, availability and non-
repudiation. 
Currently it seems that only specific types of threats have been studied, like Denial-of-
Service towards the SDN architecture; however, this master’s thesis tries to make a more 
comprehensive threat identification and concentrates on those identified threats. Along the 
research and verification phases, new possible threats were found. Mitigations on the 
verified threats are suggested as a part of the research outcome. 
This research will also carry out actual setup and verification of the identified threats to a 
certain degree within the timeframe constraints. The setup and verification is conducted in 
a virtualized environment with an SDN controller, OpenFlow switches and two Linux hosts, 
not simulating with mininet. 
Considering the benefits of the research, there is a great number of existing documentation 
and information on the SDN basics, how it works, what different functional planes are, how 
the data flows are travelling in the network; however, the threats and mitigations to the 
threats have not been addressed, especially in the planned level of details as in this 
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master’s thesis. The level of details includes the threat selection, verification setup and 
execution on the threat selection, the verification outcome analysis and the threat 
mitigation suggestions. 
1.6 Research Methods 
The meta-analysis is done in order to determine the state of the art of the SDN, SDN 
networking, security, threat landscape, weaknesses and possibilities in abusing the 
architecture. Also, traditional networking aspects in security, threats and weaknesses are 
considered if they are valid for the SDN architecture. However, the research mainly 
concentrates on the identified SDN security threats. 
An academic discipline combines the research principles of sciences and humanities; the 
research is based on the library and written resources, and a selection of research based 
hypotheses is verified in the verification lab conditions. The hypotheses are applied to the 
real-life conditions in the form of threat mitigation suggestions. 
The verification is carried out with the networking capture tools by carefully analyzing the 
results. The manual inspection is done in the laboratory conditions where the SDN Test Bed 
(more details in chapter 4.2 Resources Needed in Verification) is configured. 
1.7 Objectives 
The objective of this master’s thesis is to understand the SDN architecture and deepen the 
knowledge on the security threats it may have. However, the main scope being the SDN, 
other related technologies and solutions are evaluated when in connection with the 
networking solutions or the services SDN provides (chapter 1.3 Client Use Cases). This is to 
help to gain understanding and overview of the technology field.  
The Analysis of Current Software Defined Networking Threats (Slavov et al.  2016) identifies 
threats and vulnerabilities towards the SDN. Those identified threats and vulnerabilities, 
and the document itself will determine the threat selection to be verified in the scope of 
this master’s thesis. Not all the threats are addressed in the verification part of this 
master’s thesis. 
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The desirable outcome was met as new possible vulnerabilities were found in the course of 
conducting the verification. For those possible vulnerability findings, which may form into 
threats, mitigations are proposed based on the verification analysis. 
2 Introduction to SDN 
In this chapter, the SDN history and present day are introduced. The overall architecture, 
main interfaces, layers of communication, interconnection between different modules are 
clarified along with the state-of-the-art research of the topic. Also, current limitations with 
regard to the SDN architecture and its security are studied. 
2.1 Brief History of SDN 
The history of the SDN lies in the programmable and dynamically deployable networking. 
The active networks presented the network API concept where the custom functionalities 
can be applied to the networking resources (Feamster, Rexford & Zegura 2013, 1). There 
were two directions in the field at the time: capsule model and programmable networking 
device model. Also, according to Feamster et al. (2013, 1), there is a resemblance to the 
early telephony networks which had a clear separation of control and data planes. The 
separation simplified the network management and the deployment of new services. 
Briefly the principle of telephony networks, i.e. Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 
was to split the telephony network into smaller manageable pieces, i.e. classes. Classes 
interconnected the different geographical areas and different devices in the telephony 
network. 
Wetherall, Guttag & Tennenhouse (1998, 117) sketched an idea of an architecture of an 
active network toolkit which enables new protocol deployment automatically between the 
networking devices. The mobile code, i.e. general-purpose code techniques would be 
utilized to create a communication model which allows co-existence of the different 
networking protocols. 
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The network service is flexible. Different applications are able to introduce new 
protocols into the network by specifying the routines to be executed at 
network nodes that forward their messages. Applications may customize 
network processing to suit their needs by pushing processing into the network 
- either processing that is traditionally performed at end-systems or novel 
kinds of processing that only make sense in the context of active networks. 
(Wetherall et al. 1998, 117 – 118.) 
The idea may have been too revolutionary and the active networks or early SDN for some 
reason did not pick up, the reason assumed to be the missing pushes in the technology and 
networking (Feamster et al. 2013, 5). Wetherall et al. (1998, 117, 127) identified difficulties 
in the network protocol change process, finding consensus on the new protocol, their 
interoperability and in the process deployment.  Later on, Feamster et al. (2013, 2, 10) 
suggest remediation and catalyst being the progress in other related areas like distributed 
systems, operating systems and programming languages. The programmable network 
required programmable packet processing at high speed to evolve. Also, the use cases were 
not clear at the time. 
For SDN to evolve from today on and become a solid and popular solution for networking, 
the use case need presented in history still persists, and as well as the customer's need for 
the technology. Mere networking management and packet forwarding with programmable 
APIs may not be enough but more networking service support may be required. The deep-
packet inspection, transcoding of packets, programmable HW and Network Function 
Virtualization (NFV) could enable the wider networking services support according to 
Feamster et al. (2013, 11). 
Originally the SDN was a Stanford University’s OpenFlow project; however, now Feamster 
et al. (2013, 2) recognize a wide array of technologies as part of the SDN. Today the SDN is 
novel again. But, what does the abbreviation’s SD-part mean, Software-Defined? 
Longbottom (2015) refers it as decoupling software from hardware. Depending on the view 
point, What is Software-Defined Compute (2016) states that it is bringing the technology 
functions into the virtualized infrastructure. HP talks about the SDI, Software-Defined 
Infrastructure. In their definition when thinking about the SDN, it is one fundamental part 
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of the SDI along with computing, storage and facilities. The figure below (Figure 1) 
illustrates the solution (HP SDI for the future of Data Center. 2014, 13). 
 
There is also related term SDE or SDx, Software-Defined Everything. That solution includes 
the SDN, Software-Defined Data Center, the SDDC, and Software-Defined Storage, the SDS. 
Including the facilities in the SDDC, which makes the difference of SDE/SDx with the SDI 
very minor or even non-existing (Matthews n.d.). The terms are overlapping as the SD in a 
sense is a new technological solution and an established terminology is not yet fully in 
place. 
What is the SDN? In the SDI solution, the SDN enables networking between different SD 
objects. The SDN implements the core features of any SD object: architecture and planes of 
communication, main interfaces, and interconnection between the different modules. 
The current limitations of the SDN architecture, and the OpenFlow protocol in particular, 
are considered here. The considerations are based on the technical restrictions of the 
OpenFlow protocol and their tendency to hinder the usage or making the solution 
vulnerable in the interest of making administrational tasks less complex or stressing the 
resources less. Some of these items are addressed in detail in the upcoming chapters and 
are especially related to forwarding rules, i.e. flow entry modifications and monitoring the 
traffic in the SDN network. 
Figure 1. Software Defined Infrastructure by HP. 
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The latest specification for OpenFlow protocol, version 1.5.1, is used as a reference for the 
overall apprehension of the current state of the protocol implementation. The verification 
considerations are, however, done with devices supporting OpenFlow 1.3.5 as it is the 
version supported in the current virtual switch solution used, Open vSwitch. The limitations 
are considered between the latest OpenFlow release 1.5.1 to 1.3.5 as considering it as a 
realistic scenario that the latest version of the protocol may not be supported with the 
virtual switch solutions.  
2.2 Layers of Control Platforms and Their Scope 
The SDN architecture is a three-tier solution. The figure below represents the tiers (Figure 
2). The SDN applications in the application plane communicate with the SDN controller via 
the North Bound Interface (NBI). The SDN controller is located in the Controller Plane. The 
SDN controller communicates with networking devices in the forwarding plane via the 
South Bound Interface (SBI). This represents the decoupling of the functionalities. (SDN 
Architecture 2014, 13.) 
 
The decoupled architecture brings benefits to networking. The decoupling enables the 
device management centrally from the SDN controller, and the controller and the 
forwarding device need not to be on the same device. A device can be a physical or a virtual 
Figure 2. SDN Architecture (Op. cit. 13). 
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networking device with the OpenFlow protocol compliance. The management is done via 
the open standard OpenFlow protocol. The versatile management enables the resource 
additions or reductions based on the traffic needs. The forwarding functions are conducted 
separately in the data plane. The decoupling also enables the applications to communicate 
directly with the SDN controller via API.  
The benefits of the SDN include the architecture being “dynamic, manageable, cost-
effective, and adaptable” (Software-Defined Networking (SDN) Definition n.d., chapter 
What is SDN). The dynamicity enables that new virtual devices can be added to the 
architecture for scalability purposes. The new enlarged entity can be managed centrally 
from the SDN controller. The possibility to use virtual devices and scaling them according to 
the usage needs makes the solution cost-effective. The vendor-neutrality in the devices and 
protocols makes the solution also adaptable. 
2.3 Flow Table 
This chapter describes the communication between the switch and the controller in the 
SDN architecture in the OpenFlow Channel and Control Channel. The significant messages 
in the transportation channel between the two entities are described.  
An OpenFlow channel is an interface between an OpenFlow switch and an 
OpenFlow controller. Control Channel includes one OpenFlow Channel per 
OpenFlow controller. (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5 2015, 11-12.) 
To understand the communication between the network elements and the SDN controller, 
the flow table format and its communication principles are clarified here.  
Flow table is a stage of pipeline. Pipeline is a set of linked flow tables for 
matching and forwarding packets. Flow table consists of flow entries. Flow 
entry is an element used to match and process packets. (OpenFlow Switch 
Specification 1.3.5 2015, 11-12.)  
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A flow table consists of sequential flow entries, starting from 0. The flow entry contains the 
execution instructions for an action. The execution instruction can be an action, for 
example for packet forwarding or modifying. The processing pipeline is the path which a 
flow entry travels in the flow table based on the action set. The first three examples of the 
actions are self-explanatory in the below figure (Figure 3); however, the normal (packet) 
processing pipeline requires clarification. According to Fei (2014, 93), it refers to processing 
the packet as a Non-OpenFlow switch. This is the case of an action output being 
“forwarding packets to virtual ports”. 
 
The script more_tables.txt (Mahler 2014) in the example below (Figure 4) deploys flow 
tables and related actions to the mininet simulated virtual network; however, this example 
can be used to gain understanding of the flow table creation also in the realistic virtual 
device SDN controller networks.  
 
 
Figure 3. Flow table (Stanford University’s OpenFlow Wiki 2010, chapter Flow Table Entries).  
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The flow table 0 (Figure 5 below) allows all IP and ARP traffic in the 10.0.0.0/24 network. 
The Ping, i.e. ICMP packets are allowed from source 10.0.0.1 and destination 30.0.0.3 in the 
different subnet. Also the TCP connection to the port 80 from 10.0.0.1 is allowed to 
30.0.0.3, which can be verified by issuing the curl command from 10.0.0.1 towards 30.0.0.3. 
The table 0 drops all the other packets, which can be verified by trying to ping from host 
10.0.0.2 to destination 30.0.0.3. The suitable packets are forwarded to processing pipeline 
to the table 1, resubmitted to the next table by defining ,1 as a parameter. 
 
The flow table 1 (Figure 6 below) is acting as a network address translator: the IP packets 
from the 10.0.0.1 to the 30.0.0.3, their source address is changed to 5.5.5.5. When the IP 
traffic returns from the destination 30.0.0.3, the new source address for the 5.5.5.5 is set to 
be 10.0.0.1. These packets are forwarded to the processing pipeline to the flow table 2. The 
default action is to continue to the flow table 2. 
Figure 5. Flow table 0 rules and actions (Mahler 2014). 
Figure 4. Flow script (Mahler 2014). 
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The actual forwarding action takes place in the flow table 2. For example, IP packets to the 
destination 10.0.0.1 are forwarded via the port 1. The destination MAC address is also 
changed in this action. The actions are respective in the first three entries in the flow table 
2 (Figure 7 below). The latter 2 entries forward the ARP request to the 10.0.0.1 via port 1 
and to the 10.0.0.2 via port 2. The actions are respective in the first three entries in the flow 
table 2. The latter 2 entries forward ARP request to 10.0.0.1 via port 1 and 10.0.0.2 via port 
2. 
2.4 Security in SDN 
The OpenFlow protocol security features are evaluated in this chapter. “The OpenFlow 
protocol does not implement security by itself, therefore the transport protocol or a 
protocol underneath it must provide security if it is needed.” (OpenFlow Switch 
Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 36.) In the SDN, the security is left on the administrators’ 
responsibility since there is an option: “The OpenFlow channel is usually encrypted using 
TLS, but may be run directly over TCP.” (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 31.) The 
before mentioned specification recommends to use the TLS version 1.2 or higher. It is the 
latest approved version of the secure communications over the Internet, and it is also 
suitable for the client/server solutions to maintain especially authentication, confidentiality 
and integrity in the communications (Dierks & Rescorla 2008, 1).  The recommendation 
does not force the usage of the TLS. 
The best features of the SDN architecture, such as centralized control and programmability, 
also make the architecture unsecure. According to Principles and Practices for Securing 
Software-Defined Networks (2015, 8-9), the centralized control may compromise the SDN 
Figure 7. Flow table 2 rules and actions (Mahler 2014). 
Figure 6. Flow table 1 rules and actions (Mahler 2014). 
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controller, which may endanger the entire networks’ functionality. The programmability via 
the API enables the implementation of innovative applications but also leaves an open 
interface for the malicious applications. 
The SDN controller implementations may have security enhancements which address the 
main issues of security: role-based authentication and security constraint enforcement. 
Hence, the next paragraph introduces briefly FortNOX and its successor SE-Floodlight and 
their solutions for these security constraints. 
FortNOX is an extension for the NOX OpenFlow Controller. It implements the role-based 
authentication with three layers: the human administration with the highest priority, 
security application to further strengthen security policy due to identified malicious attack 
and non-security application with a lowest priority. The authentication is implemented with 
digital signatures. The security constraint enforcement is implemented with the conflicting 
flow rule detection, rule reduction and security policy synchronization (Porras, Shinz, 
Yegneswarany, Fongy, Tysony & Guz 2012, 1, 3 - 4). 
The SE-Floodlight is an extension to provide enhanced security to the SDN architecture with 
a different role-based authentication solution. 
Least Privilege feature enables OpenFlow applications to operate outside the 
controller process context. PACKET_OUT Control: PACKET_OUT messages 
produced by OpenFlow applications can now be restricted by administrators. 
Security Audit feature introduces a new OpenFlow audit subsystem that tracks 
all security-relevant events produced by the OpenFlow network stack. (SDN 
Security Suite 2015.) 
The security extension provides convincing security enhancements to secure the SDN 
architecture. The extensions could even be considered vital in using the SDN architecture 
and solutions. 
3 Identified Threats Towards the SDN Controller 
In this chapter, the selection of threats to be verified is done. The selection is carefully 
reasoned based on the priority from the client’s point-of-view and also considering the 
scope and resources in this research. The client has indicated that it would be in their 
interest to discover the possible SDN controller vulnerabilities, and if OpenFlow Channel 
and Control Channel can be compromised. This ties the whole SDN architecture to the 
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research, which in this case is the SDN network comprising of SDN controller and four 
virtual switches supporting the OpenFlow protocol. Their mutual communication is 
monitored to detect possible anomalies in the networking traffic caused by the threat 
simulations and the actual verifications. 
3.1 Introduction to the Threats Document 
Cyber Trust Collaboration is an ongoing project to make “Finland a leading country in Cyber 
Security”. In the scope of the project, programmable networks are in a significant role. The 
programmable networks as such are not a new thing as chapter 2.1 Brief History of SDN 
unveiled; innovative usage of the active networking was first crafted at the end of the 
1990s, and its basis on the network management simplification by separating the control 
and data plane dates back to the early telephony networks.  
The technology progress in the operating systems and programming in particular enabled 
the programmable networking as was discussed in chapter 1 Introduction. The new 
programmable networking may have unforeseen risks, and those possible risks are being 
assessed. If risks are identified, the treatment is planned according to those risks forming 
the vulnerabilities. The reference threat analysis does also risk treatment, i.e. mitigation of 
the possible vulnerabilities which may form into threats. This research complements the 
mitigations based on the verification outcome.  
The document has identified attacks via the forwarding plane, control network threats, i.e. 
Southbound Interface (SBI) targeted attacks and attacks via Northbound Interface (NBI). 
The scope of threat verification in this research is in the SBI targeted attacks. From the 
reference document’s selection of the threats, following threats are verified: 
1. Traffic capture is done to gather information of the target 
2. Impersonating an SDN agent, especially OpenFlow switch, to compromise the SDN 
controller via the control channel 
2.1. Threats towards virtual SDN switches; compromising the switch running on 
hypervisor and utilizing hypervisor’s vulnerabilities 
2.2. OpenFlow table manipulation can be used in impersonation 
2.3. Attacking the Integrity and Confidentiality of the Southbound Traffic; hijacking 
connection and take over a switch 
2.4. Attacks mounted via forwarding plane: attacker is the user or has gained access to 
a host in the forwarding network.  
2.5. Attacks from the Control Network, i.e. Control Channel; utilizing dedicated physical 
network 
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3. Configuration errors are utilized and also protocol implementation flaws to generate 
vulnerabilities in the target network. 
3.1. Protocol flaws i.e. missing security functions enable unsecure networking 
 
The selection done by the client indicated interest priorities. Certain threats enable a next 
step in the attack avenue, such as hijacking a connection to a switch and via that 
manipulating the flow tables. Those combinations of the threats are formed into interesting 
and relevant verification scenarios. 
3.2 OpenFlow Protocol Weaknesses 
To assess different ways possible to compromise the SDN controller, the possible 
weaknesses of the SDN OpenFlow protocol are considered here. The hard timeout for flow 
entries enables expirations in the defined time regardless of the packets being directed 
towards the flow entry. The use of the timeouts becomes needful in case of a switch losing 
the connection to the SDN controller, and expired flow rules should be cleaned out. 
However, if the switch has been configured to function in the fail standalone mode, it 
reverts to the Ethernet switching and the reconnection to the SDN controller does not 
occur. This will leave the functionality of the specific part of the network non-functional. In 
case of misconfigured promiscuous mode of the switch, all the traffic traversing the virtual 
switch is seen. 
The administrator of the SDN network is not enforced to configure secure communication. 
The usage of non-supporting TLS communication in the SDN network allows 
unauthenticated access. An attacker may exploit this feature and gain access to the SDN 
network. 
A handshake message is a feature request from the SDN controller towards a switch. The 
handshake indicates for the SDN controller what are a switch’s basic functionalities 
(OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 76). Without a successful handshake, there will 
be a handshake failure. A handshake failure can also be caused by a version mismatch in an 
OpenFlow command (State Machine n.d).  Without a successful handshake, communication 
session will not be established in the Control Channel between the SDN controller and a 
switch.  
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When setting up the communication between the SDN controller and a switch, the mode of 
recovering from the connection interrupt may make the SDN network vulnerable. If ovs-
ofctl command set-fail-mode is used to set the handling of connection failure to fail 
standalone –option, the switch will not try to re-connect after a connection failure. It also 
gains full ownership of the flow tables and flow entries. If a switch is under an attacker’s 
influence, the attacker may manage the flow tables. 
The configuration errors may cause vulnerabilities when enabling the SDN features. For 
example, the hard_timeout defines how long a flow entry keeps the flow rules active 
(OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 80). Setting the hard_timeout to zero means 
that the flow entry is permanent (Op. cit. 21) and in case of the SDN controller disconnect, 
the unnecessary or malicious flow entry may keep on forwarding traffic. 
3.3 Vulnerable SDN and Switch SW 
For verifying in theory, the possibility of compromising a networking device connected to 
the SDN controller, a vulnerable version of the OpenFlow switch and OpenDaylight (ODL) 
SDN Controller SW are researched. In the case of a virtual NW device, switch, also a 
vulnerable SW version may pose the device to a vulnerability or a threat. The virtual switch 
is a newish technology emerged alongside virtualization and hence, it can contain 
implementation faults resulting in vulnerable SW. The physical switch SW is assumed to 
have more built-in security enhancements, however, they still may contain fundamental 
vulnerabilities, such as default passwords. To be suitable for this scenario, they need to 
support the OpenFlow protocol. 
The scenario is to evaluate if a data plane switch connected to the SDN control plane can 
distort the data flow without the SDN controller to recognize the faulty data flow. The 
ability of the SDN controller to detect the faulty data flow begins with observing the flow 
statistics on the switch and on the SDN controller. The flow statistics should be identical in 
the case of legit data flows, otherwise the flow statistics counters comparison on the SDN 
controller and on the compromised switch should differ.  
This Vulnerable SDN and Switch SW scenario does not differentiate whether the switch is 
virtual or physical, and therefore considers vulnerabilities on a generic level for switches. 
The only requirement is the OpenFlow protocol support on a switch. 
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Most of the vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database 
regarding the SDN and data flows are Denial-of-Service type vulnerabilities. The contingent 
ways to enable the DoS include authentication, remote authentication and hijack of the 
authentication of the administrators, checking of the administrative authorization role 
based authorization, buffer overflows and malformed traffic. (SDN and Flow Vulnerabilities 
n.d.). The latest version of the OpenFlow Switch Specification version 1.5.1 is used as a 
reference here to get an overview of all versions’ possible vulnerabilities. 
Are the control plane and data plane properly separated? Are they running on different 
interfaces? Next, these dilemmas are addressed.  “If a packet does not match a flow entry 
in a flow table, this is a table miss” (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.5.1. 2015, 20.) In this 
scenario, a switch contacts the SDN controller for further instructions on where to forward 
a packet.  Other reasons to cause similar communication, i.e. packet_in message transport 
between the SDN controller and a switch, can be invalid time-to-live (TTL) of the message 
or a flow entry instruction action being meant to be output to the SDN controller. The 
control channel is used for this kind of communication between the switch and the SDN 
controller.   
If a valid Connection URI specifies TCP as the protocol, the TCP connection is 
initiated by the switch on startup to the controller, which is listening either on 
a user-specified TCP port or on the default TCP port 6653. Optionally, the TCP 
connection is initiated by the controller to the switch, which is listening either 
on a user-specified TCP port or on the default TCP port 6653. (OpenFlow Switch 
Specification 1.5.1 2015, 46.) 
The communication between the networking devices and the SDN controller goes via the 
OpenFlow Pipeline. The out-of-band connections vs. the in-band connections are 
considered here in the aspect of how feasible it is to compromise especially the switch-
controller communication path.  
For out-of-band connections, the switch must make sure that traffic to and 
from the OpenFlow channel is not run through the OpenFlow pipeline. For in-
band connections, the switch must set up the proper set of flow entries for the 
connection in the OpenFlow pipeline. (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.5.1 
2015, 36.) 
The table misses can be caused by an invalid time-to-live (TTL), by an OpenFlow version 
mismatch between the SDN controller and the switch or by a feature request failure. The 
TTL is a packet-in feature, and the OpenFlow version and the feature request are responses 
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to the packet-in requests. This request-reply pair is called a handshake. (OpenFlow Switch 
Specification 1.5.1 2015, 104.) The failures in the message format or request response may 
cause the need for using the communication channel. An attacker could exploit the need of 
using the control channel communication with malformed packets. A malformed packet 
may initiate the request on the control channel in a packet-in message and spoof the data. 
If queuing or per-flow meters (limit sent packet rate to the SDN controller) are not used, 
the DoS may happen, at least more easily (Op. cit. 104). 
In the port configuration messages, a property for not sending the packet-in messages to a 
specific port can be set according to OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.5.1 (2015, 67);  
OFPPC_NO_PACKET_IN = 1 << 6 /* Do not send packet-in msgs for port. */ 
 
This property of the packet could be utilized not to send a malicious packet to the SDN 
controller for further instructions on how to handle it. 
During the reconnaissance phase if a target information with (as per OpenFlow Switch 
Specification 1.5.1. 2015, 42)  
protocol:name or address:port (tcp:xxx.xxx.xxx:6653) 
 
is discovered, Connection URI may be compromised.   
How to utilize the physical switch’s management port remotely? Assuming here that the 
local connections are not feasible, the remote connection should be set up. The remote 
connection may be set up already by the system administration to debug remotely in the 
possibly problematic situations. This way an attacker could exploit the management port 
connections in case that have gained the credentials for it. The OpenFlow compliant switch 
needs to be configured to listen to the SDN controller via a specific port. Connecting to the 
switch via the management port remotely using the current transport port 6653 (OpenFlow 
Switch Specification 1.5.1 2015, 42), it is assumed that the connection to control channel 
can be achieved. 
Next, the usage of physical switches in the SDN Solution is considered. The CVE vulnerability 
database has an item with a description:  
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Cisco Network Services (CNS) NetFlow Collection Engine (NFC) before 6.0 has 
an nfcuser account with the default password nfcuser, which allows remote 
attackers to modify the product configuration and, when installed on Linux, 
obtain login access to the host operating system. (Vulnerability Summary for 
CVE-2007-2282 2013.) 
It would collect the traffic statistics when the data flows entered or exited an interface in 
the SDN solution. This feature is not applicable for this scenario as it is an additional SW on 
top of the Cisco IOS collecting the IP network traffic.   
The next task is to try to find even lower level exploits, i.e. vulnerable switch OS versions 
which could be utilized in this scenario. Juniper’s JunOS has a vulnerability which can be 
exploited with hand-crafted telnet messages to compromise the entire switch.  
Due to a buffer overflow vulnerability in the SRX Series flow daemon (flowd) 
while processing certain crafted telnet protocol messages, a remote attacker 
may be able to execute arbitrary code leading to a complete compromise of 
the system. This issue only occurs if telnet pass-through authentication is 
configured on the firewall. (2013-10 Security Bulletin (CVE-2013-6013) 2013.) 
The SRX is a firewall, not a switch SW, hence, it is not applicable for this scenario.  
The Cisco switches use the NX-OS operating system which has vulnerabilities defined in the 
CVE. The vulnerabilities can be found with the keyword “Cisco NX OS” (CVE Cisco NX-OS 
Security Vulnerabilities n.d.). The CVE-2016-1329 (Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2016-
1329 2016) reveals hardcoded credentials on the IoS, which allows remote attackers to gain 
root privileges via telnet or SSH. The vulnerable iOS is of version 6.0., this version of 
operating system could be installed to the physical switch in the verification environment. 
The physical switches have this kind of critical vulnerabilities and if those are not handled, 
the attacker has a very high chance in succeeding to compromise a switch and along with 
that the other devices in the network. 
In the theory of verification outline, a virtual switch is either based on the OpenFlow 
protocol or supports it. The virtual switches in the SDN Testbed use the Open vSwitch 
OpenFlow supporting images. 
3.3.1 Theory of Verification 
The search of unsecure versions of the SDN controller did not require special effort; it is in 
the hands of the SDN administrator to leave the solution unsecure or to make it secure. The 
strengthening of the communication protocol, such as TCP with TLS is entirely optional. The 
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unsecure SDN network can be easily configured by leaving out the additional security 
features. 
Using the non-supporting TLS configuration, the SDN controller allows unauthenticated 
access to it. By default, the TLS is not enabled in the OpenDaylight Beryllium SDN controller, 
hence the default settings are used for the verification scenario to mimic a vulnerable 
target. After gaining the unauthorized access to the switch, the attacker could make 
changes to the configuration files without the SDN controller taking notice. The 
Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2012-4122 (2013) vulnerability enables to overwrite or 
create arbitrary files via the shell output redirection. This vulnerability could be exploited in 
this scenario. 
At this point of research, it was realized that the OpenDaylight SDN controller version needs 
to support the OpenFlow version 1.3, which is due to already configured Open vSwitches 
and their versions in the SDN Test Bed environment. Hence, the suitable specification 
version 1.3.5 for the OpenFlow switches is used from now on as a reference. 
3.3.2 SDN Network Statistics Monitoring 
A switch in the SDN architecture has capabilities of providing statistics for a flow, a flow 
table, a port, and network devices, i.e. interfaces, a group and a queue.  With the network 
traffic statistics, it is verified that the generated traffic is reaching its targets in the SDN 
architecture. The generated traffic is simple, such as connectivity checks between the hosts 
with ping.  
The group and queue statistics are not used. The group statistics are not used as the threat 
scenarios do not include multicast or flooding inside the SDN architecture (OpenFlow 
Switch Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 22). The queue statistics are not used as the Quality-of-
Service packet feature is not set (Op. cit. 56). 
The OpenFlow port level feature enables the collection of the detailed port statistics on a 
specified port from a certain switch. The other ways with different granularity to collect 
statistics are by flows or by flow tables. The flows present the statistics at the granularity 
level of packet and bytes statistics. The flow tables show statistics for all the tables with 
flow rules. The flow statistics also output the flow rules in a certain table. The summary on 
the packets and bytes is printed for the respective port, table or interface. The interface 
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statistics for the network devices associated with a switch are presented in the similar 
manner. (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 90, 93, 99.) 
The statistics are collected in the SDN networking layer to verify the possible difference in 
the switch and in the SDN controller statistics counters. However, the granularity of the 
measurements is limited to the port based counters, the more accurate application layer 
measurements are not recorded in this phase. The granularity is based on van Adrichem, 
Doerr & Kuipers’s (2014, 2) statement on using port based counters; “It lacks the ability to 
differ between different applications and traffic flows.” This is where an SDN statistics 
application would bring remedy to in the form of collecting application specific networking 
traffic as mentioned in the assumptions when considering the scenarios for the use cases in 
chapter 1.3 Client Use Cases. 
On the SDN controller side, DLUX UI, the graphical user interface, provides a view of the 
statistics. The statistics shown are port, flow table or flow based. The OpenDaylight’s Model 
Drive Service Abstraction Layer (MD-SAL) module Nodes collects the networking and port 
statistics (Figure 8 on the next page). The Node ID is for a switch connected to the SDN 
network. The Node Connectors show the port statistics per switch (Figure 9 after the next 
page). The Node Connectors column shows the number of interfaces on the switch. It also 
maps ports to the interfaces and in the SDN network specific switch IDs. The flow table 
statistics for a specific switch (or node) can be seen with the option Flows. If no other than 
default table is defined, the graphical user interface will not show any statistics. 
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Figure 8. OpenDaylight DLUX UI view on Nodes statistics. 
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Figure 9. Node Connectors view in DLUX UI for SW4. 
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The command line tool for monitoring the OpenFlow Switches, ovs-ofctl (Open vSwitch 
Manual 2.6.90 n.d.) can be used to collect the statistics. The statistics are collected port, 
table or flow based. The different monitoring options can be used according to the list 
below. An example of the flow entries can be found in the figure below (Figure 10). 
• Checks ports 
show -O <openflow version> <bridge><if> 
show -O openflow13 of-switch LOCAL/eth1/eth2 
• Prints to the console statistics for each of the flow tables used by switch.  
dump-tables -O <openflow version> <bridge> 
dump-tables -O openflow13 of-switch 
• Prints to the console all flow entries in switch’s tables that match flows.   If flows 
parameter is omitted, all flows in the switch are retrieved.   
dump-flows -O <openflow version> <bridge> 
dump-flows -O openflow13 of-switch 
• Prints to the console statistics for network devices associated with switch.  If netdev 
is specified, only the statistics associated with that device will be printed.  netdev 
can be an OpenFlow assigned port number or device name, e.g. eth0. 
dump-ports -O <openflow version> <bridge> <netdev> 
dump-ports -O openflow13 of-switch eth0 
 
4 Verification of Threats 
In this chapter the threat landscape, verification environment and its configuration are 
described. The verification environment consists of the SDN Test Bed providing virtual 
resources for setting up the SDN controller and related networking devices. The 
environment configuration shows detailed configurations for the SDN architecture. 
4.1 Threat Landscape Targets 
The threat landscape targets consist of the SDN architecture related virtual or physical 
devices, SDN controller and switch(es) as well as the interfaces between them. 
Figure 10. Flow entries example in the default flow table. 
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4.1.1 SDN Controller and Switches 
The OpenFlow Switch Management Commands Command Line Interface, ovs-ofctl CLI, 
shows the supported version of the OpenFlow: 0x1:0x4 (Figure 11 below). 
The release notes in the OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.5.1 2015 (p. 256 - 271) state that 
the codes mean support for the protocol versions 1.0 to 1.3.5. Hence, for the verification 
scenarios the version 1.3.5 OpenFlow Switch Specification is used as a reference. The 
chosen OpenDaylight SDN controller version, Beryllium, is backwards compatible with the 
OpenFlow protocol version 1.3.5. The multiple controller setup is not in the scope the 
master’s thesis. 
4.1.2 OpenFlow Channel Messages 
The communication packets, controller-to-switch messages establish the connection 
between a controller and a switch in the SDN network. The example messages are listed in 
the next page (Table 1), and the communication direction is indicated to clarify the initiator 
of the message.  
The handshake from the SDN controller requests identity and basic capabilities of a switch 
in its managed network. In reply, the switch shares its capabilities: flow, table, port, group 
and queue statistics. The capabilities also include reassembling the IP fragments and 
blocking looping ports. A Table Miss or invalid Time-To-Live field enable the sending of 
PACKET_IN messages towards the SDN controller. The switch has no rules where to forward 
such packets, since it is giving the control of the packets to the SDN controller. The 
PACKET_OUT is a response from the SDN controller to the switch for the PACKET_IN 
message (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 76, 107, 110). 
  
Figure 11. OpenFlow version check command. 
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Table 1. SDN controller and switch communication packets. 
Type Initiator Message 
HANDSHAKE Controller Identity and capabilities: OFPT_FEATURES_REQUEST 
 Switch Identity and capabilities: OFPT_FEATURES_REPLY 
PACKET_IN Switch Table miss: OFPR_NO_MATCH 
 Switch Invalid TTL: OFPR_INVALID_TTL 
PACKET_OUT Controller Reply to PACKET_IN: OFPT_PACKET_OUT 
 
4.2 Resources Needed in Verification 
The infrastructure and environments for verification are provided by the Realistic Global 
Cyber Environment (RGCE) of JAMK University of Applied Sciences (JAMK) (Cyber Operation 
Environment – RGCE n.d.). The environment, RGCE, functions like the Internet: it has real 
structures and functionalities of the Internet starting from public IP addresses and 
geographical locations to the core services of the Internet (e.g. name services, update 
repositories, certificate infrastructure).  It is an isolated and controlled environment, and it 
offers a risk-free environment for use of attacks, known vulnerabilities and real malware. It 
also simulates the real network traffic as the traffic generation software utilizes the same 
functional principles as botnets. The bots are controlled by a Web based User Interfaces 
and command servers for modeling the realistic user behavior and end user traffic on the 
Internet. (Op. cit.) 
The Management-VM host runs Linux Debian 3.16.0-4-amd64. It provides a graphical user 
interface for the OpenDaylight’s DLUX User Interface. 
In the RGCE, there are virtual machines configured for the verification in the SDN Testbed 
(Figure 12 on the following page). One virtual machine acts as a target for the malicious 
attacks (Host2) and the other one as the attacker (Host3). The environment also includes an 
SDN controller implemented with the OpenDaylight (ODL) and virtual switches (SW1-4).  
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Figure 12. JAMK SDN testbed. 
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The verification concentrates on the SDN controller threats; however, the infrastructure for 
the verification includes a target and a host to ensure the communications and common 
malicious attacks with vulnerability and penetration testing tools; Kali Linux (Host3 in above 
Figure 12) and Metasploitable (Host2 in above Figure 12). Kali Linux is a penetration testing 
infrastructure: 
Kali Linux is a Debian-based Linux distribution aimed at advanced Penetration 
Testing and Security Auditing. Kali contains several hundred tools aimed at 
various information security tasks, such as Penetration Testing, Forensics and 
Reverse Engineering. (What is Kali Linux 2016.) 
With Kali Linux’s network scan tools and manifold penetration testing tool selection, the 
vulnerability of verification target, SDN architecture, is assessed. 
Metasploitable is a penetration testing solution to simulate attacks with an extensive 
exploit database. Metasploitable also acts as an intentionally vulnerable target in the 
verification environment.  
4.3 Verification Environment Configuration 
The verification environment configuration will enable the threat scenario verifications. The 
verification scenarios aim is to find threats towards the SDN architecture. The threats may 
be very low level, i.e. protocol level enabled vulnerabilities. The protocol may allow 
vulnerable configurations to decrease the load on a switch by disabling the port statistics 
counters. However, the downside of enabling this feature may expose the switch to 
another vulnerability. In this case, SDN controller would not have knowledge of the port 
statistics and therefore, no full knowledge about the traffic in the SDN network. 
The minimum-security configurations are intentionally enabled to highlight the 
vulnerabilities caused by the non-enforced security features. 
The configurations cover generic verification environment configuration in the higher Linux 
OS level and also in more detailed level specifically for the SDN network and its devices. 
4.3.1 Generic Verification Environment Configurations 
The generic settings of the entire verification environment are listed in the table below 
(Table 2). They will enable the basic functionalities to setup the verification environment. 
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The basic functionalities prevent the possible verification traffic to reach unintended 
targets, make use of the vulnerabilities of the OpenFlow protocol to compromise devices in 
the SDN architecture like switches and SDN controller, enable the OpenFlow statistics 
collection etc. 
Table 2. Generic verification environment settings. 
Action Command 
Terminate traffic to vulnerable target by 
disabling IP forwarding. 
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
Failure mode for switch in case of control 
channel disruption. Prevents switch from 
sending faulty flows towards the SDN 
controller. Can be used just in the opposite 
scenario to compromise the SDN 
controller. 
fail secure –mode or fail standalone –mode 
ovs-vsctl set-fail-mode <bridge> secure 
Configure flows with expiration time to 
prevent DoS (Not an interesting scenario as 
addressed in many papers.) 
 
Keys and certificates for TLS connection 
between switch and SDN controller 
- Scenario: only controller side 
certificates are checked 
- Scenario: both the switch and 
controller certificates are checked 
 
Verify TLS connection parameters to verify 
the actual version of TLS, cipher suite etc. 
openssl s_client 
Follow flows inside the flow table  
Optional: masquerading/spoofing; 
associating attacker’s MAC address with 
another host’s IP address to redirect 
messages to attacker 
 
OpenDaylight DayLight User Experience 
(DLUX) User Interface (UI) (OpenDaylight 
DLUX:DLUX Karaf Feature (n.d)) 
Karaf to install networking modules, prior 
to accessing the DLUX 
- Relevant modules? restconf, odl l2 
switch and switch to get started and 
get overview of all modules in the UI. 
 
Accessing the UI: 
http://localhost:8181/index.html (Default 
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Action Command 
password is admin/admin, changed 
immediately after first login) 
Metasploit; add default gateway to 
connect to same network as Kali  
route add default gw 203.0.113.1 eth0 
Disable DHCP client on Kali to prevent 
unnecessary traffic during verification 
Configure /etc/network/interfaces to use 
static configuration instead of DHCP. 
Disable dhclient. 
4.3.2 SDN Controller Configuration 
The OpenDaylight SDN controller Beryllium installation was chosen as it supports OpenFlow 
1.0 and 1.3 which are the SDN Test Bed’s compatible Open vSwitch OpenFlow versions.  
The OpenDaylight SDN controller version info (Figure 13): 
To enable needed features in the SDN controller, installed features, i.e. plugins can be 
checked with the following command in Karaf: 
feature:list -i 
To verify which features are installed, referring to in below path is useful: 
distribution/opendaylight-karaf/target/assembly/etc/org.apache.karaf.features.cfg 
The features are installed on the need basis, and in the outset the following features were 
identified as needed features based on the OpenDaylight Features List (n.d).  
• DLUX UI: graphical user interface for ODL. Feature name: odl-dlux-all, odl-dlux-core, 
odl-dlux-node 
• YANG (controller components data structure): odl-dlux-yangui, odl-dlux-
yangvisualizer 
• OF-CONFIG: OF Switch communicating with OF, and configuration of OF data paths. 
Feature name in odl-of-config-all 
• OF-PLUGIN: support for OF-enabled devices. Supported OF versions 1.0 and 1.3.2. 
Included in odl-config-all. 
• L2Switch. Feature name odl-l2switch-switch-rest and ui. 
• MdSAL APIDocs. Feature name odl-mdsal-all. 
• REST API: odl-restconf-all 
Figure 13. Version info and pid from instance.properties -file of the Beryllium. 
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DLUX related modules in the Karaf UI (Figure 14 below): 
Beryllium contains additional features to secure the SDN controller, in the outset, however, 
these features are not installed to identify new possible vulnerabilities due to the secure 
configuration disregard:  
• CONTROLLER: multi-protocol controller infrastructure for multi-vendor networks. 
• CONTROLLER-SHIELD: Controller security information for northbound application. 
• GBP and Op-Flex: Application-centric policy model and group-based policy 
networking model. 
• USC: encrypted communication between endpoints 
• SNBI: automatic Controller discovery and secure IP connectivity 
• DIDM: device specific configurations 
 
4.3.3 SDN Switch Configuration 
For the compatibility purposes, the version of the OpenFlow protocol is queried on the 
switches with ovs-ofctl command: 
ovs-ofctl –version 
 
The output states the version to be 2.3.0; however, the most interesting information is the 
OpenFlow protocol supported versions so that the switches are compatible with 
OpenDaylight Beryllium distribution. The compatibility was verified in subchapter 4.1.1. 
SDN Controller and Switches. 
4.3.4 SDN Network Configuration 
To setup the SDN network configuration, the IP address space is determined. It uses the 
internal network, 172.16.0.0/24. The SDN controller’s and switches’ interfaces are 
configured to that network to enable communication between the devices (Table 3 below). 
 
 
Figure 14. DLUX modules. 
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Table 3. SDN network and resource details. 
Resource IP Address Additional information 
OpenDaylight SDN 
controller  
eth0 172.16.0.15 ODL version Beryllium, runs on 
Debian Linux distro 
Open vSwitch SW1 eth0 172.16.0.101 OF protocol v1.3.5 support 
Open vSwitch SW2 eth0 172.16.0.102 OF protocol v1.3.5 support 
Open vSwitch SW3 eth0 172.16.0.103 OF protocol v1.3.5 support 
Open vSwitch SW4 eth0 172.16.0.104 OF protocol v1.3.5 support 
 
The communication interface, Bridge (or datapath) between the SDN controller and the 
switches is named to of-switch. The figure below (Figure 15) describes the setting of the 
SDN controller IP address 172.16.0.15 to bridge of-switch. The connection type is TCP and 
the TCP port for the communication is the default port 6633 (OpenFlow Switch 
Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 161). The is_connected value verifies that the connection is 
successful. The target is also verified in the bottom of the figure to be the correct one 
which was configured in the first command, tcp:172.16.0.15:6633. 
 
The setup of of-switch bridge and communication between the devices in the SDN network 
are verified in the DLUX UI topology view of the SDN network (Figure 16 in the following 
page). All the configured OpenFlow switches are visible. 
 
Figure 15. Creating and verifying SDN controller and switch connection. 
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Figure 16. DLUX UI topology view of the SDN network. 
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4.3.5 Verification Tools 
The purpose of the verification tools is to capture networking traffic, distort it, modify it and 
resend it back to the SDN network (Table 4 below).  
Table 4. Tools used in verification. 
Tool Version Description 
EditCap 1.12.1 Tools for extracting packet from wireshark pcap files 
Tcpreplay 3.4.4 Replays networking traffic. 
Wireshark 1.10.2 Network capture tool 
Macof  2.4 MAC OverFlow tool.  
Scapy 2.2.0 Packet reading, modification and sending tool i.e. 
packet manipulation tool. 
4.4 Verification Cases and Topologies 
The verification part of the master’s thesis concentrates on the SDN threats, not on the 
conventional networking threats which may have similarities. However, the conventional 
networking threats may suggest attack vectors applicable to the SDN architecture. 
To confirm the verification results, logs and reports of the verification tools are gathered. 
The verification steps are carefully recorded to assure the verification case’s reproducibility. 
What is expected to be found during the verification? This master’s thesis answers to the 
following questions: 
• Is SDN controller vulnerable and how serious the possible vulnerabilities are? 
• Is the selection of identified threats and attack vectors applicable to SDN controller? 
• How to mitigate possible threats and attack vectors? 
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4.4.1 Reconnaissance capture 
In the reconnaissance capture the SDN architecture configuration has been setup according 
to chapter 4.3. Verification Environment Configuration and specifically its subchapters 4.3.2 
SDN Controller Configuration and 4.3.4 SDN Network Configuration. The topology figure 
(Figure 17 below) illustrates the SDN network: SDN controller, switches, Kali host and 
management host interconnections and relation to RGCE. In the reconnaissance capture 
phase, Wireshark tool is used to capture the networking traffic. Without any generated 
traffic, there are, however, mainly ARP packets creating traffic. Also, some DHCP discovery 
and LLDP packets can be seen in the capture of 100 packets. 
 
The target of the verification is to collect data which hopefully can be exploited to 
compromise the SDN controller. The first step is to try to extract information about the 
used OpenFlow version. Depending on the version used, some major vulnerabilities may be 
exploited (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.5.1. 2015, chapter Release Notes). 
ARP packets are of type broadcast from hosts/senders 
• 172.16.0.101 SW1 
• 172.16.0.102 SW2 
• 172.16.0.103 SW3 
 
Figure 17. Topology view for reconnaissance 
capture scenario. 
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Based on the IP addresses and MAC addresses in the packets, the sender can be united with 
the following devices with the help from the SDN controller’s DLUX UI in the topology tab. 
SW3 OpenFlow:3:6 port has hosts connected to it which are configured to 172.16.1.0 
network. The hosts try to reach the target 172.16.1.13 by sending broadcast ARP from 
addresses 172.16.1.101-103. Based on these broadcast ARPs coming from a different 
network, there is a misconfiguration in the network. That is something which does not, 
however, affect the outcome of the verification of the scenario.  
An attacker could obtain the same data and make the same assumptions based on the 
broadcast ARPs.  Based on this data, the attacker could try to obtain the connection to the 
switch. When obtaining the connection to the switch, it takes the attacker one step closer 
to compromise the SDN controller. Compromising the SDN controller as such is not even 
needed if access to a switch in the SDN network is gained. The outcome of verification will 
make this assertion evident as will chapter 4.4.3 Lying to the SDN Controller show. 
The Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) packets are also travelling in the network. The 
purpose is to advertise a networking device’s identity, capabilities and neighbors. Based on 
the system name field of the packet, openflow:4, assumptions can be made that the device 
is an OpenFlow switch. The information known by the network administrator states that 
openflow:4 is in fact the switch #4, SW4, which is the first forwarding device for Kali 
machine. The type of the switch can be concluded to be a VMWare device based on the 
MAC address information in the LLDP packet. The source MAC address information  
Vmware_01:1b:d9 (00:50:56:01:1b:d9) 
 
states that switch is running on the VMWare, hence, it is most likely virtual switch. The port 
subtype value is 5: 
Port Subtype = Locally Assigned, Id=5 
 
which conforms to DLUX UI’s topology view’s figure that the Kali server is connected to the 
SW4’s port 5. 
Determining the IP address of the openflow:4 switch, i.e. SW4 is commenced by doing a 
broadcast ping to the broadcast address of the network. The broadcast ping with ping -b 
255.255.255.255 command does not, however, reveal any new packet in the Wireshark 
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capture. Running the arp -a command after broadcast ping should combine the MAC 
address and IP address; however, not in this occasion as the SW4 is in a different network. 
The LLDP packets are multicast type packets, which have been seen also in another network 
in the layer 2. 
In the SDN architecture and OpenFlow switches, a LLDP packet comes from SDN controller 
in packet_out message format and at that point a switch does not have any knowledge of 
the packet. In fact, an OpenFlow switch cannot by itself send, receive or process LLDP 
messages according to Pakzad, Portmann, Wee Lum & Indulska (2014, 3).  Hence, the 
switch sends the packet to the SDN controller in packet_in message and the SDN controller 
can form network topology based on those messages including switch ID and ingress port 
number. By default, in the SDN architecture the discovery is done in regular intervals so 
that the tracing of LLDP packets is not restricted to initialization time of the SDN network. 
The Netdiscover application of the Kali is used next in trying to determine the IP address of 
the SW4. Without parameters, it scans all the available and internal default networks. It 
uses only local network, and the device based the MAC in question is not found in this 
network. The tool did not provide information about the IP address of the SW4, not even 
when a virtual interface was configured in the same network as the SDN controller and the 
switches. This would indicate that the SDN network does not allow by default unauthorized 
devices to join the network, preventing this with flow table rules. 
Using the administrator known IP address of the SW4 it was injected into the ARP table.  
arp -s 172.16.0.104 00:50:56:01:1b:d9 
 
The injection did not succeed as the network was unreachable. There is no network 
configuration in the Kali host for the network in question. In theory to get the IP address of 
LLDP sending device would be the first to spoof the MAC address on the KALI server. The 
MAC spoofing would require a virtual LAN configuration for the networking interface eth0. 
If the spoofing were done straight to the eth0, all traffic would stop. After the VLAN 
Figure 18. arp -a output from Kali host after MAC spoofing. 
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configuration for the eth0 the injection was successful, and the entry was included in the 
attacker machine, i.e. in the Kali host ARP table (Figure 18). 
 
At this point, also additional insecure features will be set to the OpenFlow Channel. By 
default, it has been observed that the Open vSwitch switch operates in fail secure mode 
(Figure 19 below).  
This mode is set to fail standalone (Figure 20 below).  The change is expected to make the 
switch function as legacy Ethernet switch (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5 2015, 38). 
Starting from OpenFlow version 1.3.3. the fail standalone mode also means that “the switch 
owns the flow tables and flow entries”. (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.5.1 2015, 268.) 
This standalone mode enables more autonomy and configuration possibilities on the switch 
regarding the flow tables management. It is also used as it is expected to be one the 
enablers in compromising the SDN controller. 
A requirement for this state is also to disconnect the SDN controller connection. After 
disconnect, the switch should start function in the legacy mode and have more flow table 
management openings.  The SDN controller disconnect is simulated by exiting the Karaf 
application on the SDN controller. In this way, it is experimented to see if MAC address 
overflow command macof has any effect on filling the CAM (Content Addressable Memory) 
tables of switch. Thus, in the possible case of CAM table overflow, the switch should start 
flooding all packets to network, and those could be captured by the attacker to hopefully 
Figure 19. Switch properties. 
Figure 20. Changing switch fail mode to standalone and verification of command. 
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gain information about the network and its devices. However, the downside of this scenario 
is that it did not cause an overflow on the SDN controller and did not close the OpenFlow 
Channel towards the switch. 
After sending the massive amount of 4 000 000 MAC overflow packets, identified as 
malformed packets, no abnormal behavior was seen in the network. The fail standalone 
mode is kept still on regardless of the fact that no effects were detected during the 
scenario. However, the traffic flooding after the CAM table overflow may concern only the 
new connections according to the MAC Flood Buffer Overflow Attack (2012). The site also 
advices to verify the traffic flooding after MAC flooding and verified successful clear text 
passwords visibility via FTP connection. 
The MAC flooding with Macof tool is not a suitable stress procedure as the OpenFlow 
switches do not have MAC tables but flows. The networking traffic capture tool Wireshark 
on the Kali host sees the MAC overflow packets as malformed packets assumed to be 
forwarded to the SDN controller for further actions as the packet does not match any 
entries in the default flow table. The confirmation of malformed packets from the 
administrator point of view can be verified in the flow statistics. However, this procedure 
may not be suitable for determining the switch’s IP address and it can be used to generate 
control channel traffic via an OpenFlow switch and the SDN controller in case that is 
needed. In this case, it has been proved that traditional networking stress tool does not 
operate correctly in the SDN network. Similar functionality can theoretically be achieved by 
overflowing the flow tables.  
Still at this point the attacker has not compromised the SDN architecture or network.  
DHCP Discovery packets are sent by the Raspberry devices based on the source MAC 
address in the DHCP discovery packet. Also, the Kali server sent the DHCP Discovery 
messages regardless of the static interface configuration. This reveals the type of other 
hosts in the network which can also be valuable information for an attacker trying to 
compromise the SDN controller. These DHCP messages create unnecessary and distracting 
traffic in the SDN network, hence for the upcoming verification cases the DHCP clients 
(dhclient process) need to be disabled from devices in the SDN network. 
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4.4.2 Statistics Packets Idenfitication in The Control Channel 
The purpose of the identification of the statistic packets is to identify how the forwarding 
plane communication functions in the SDN network. If an attacker has access to a switch in 
the SDN network, there are many ways to exploit the solution. The next scenario tries to 
find a way to identify a packet in the Control Channel, use it maliciously to forge data and 
by that way make the SDN architecture vulnerable.  By identifying a certain type of packet, 
an attacker could modify the captured packet’s payload to gain intended malicious 
objective of lying to an SDN controller. The capture could give the attacker the format of 
the packets and, particularly, how to form the payload when an example packet has been 
identified. With that information, the attacker could create new packets based on the fields 
in the statistics command capture and use them maliciously. The attacker could also create 
invalid frames to enable Control Channel traffic between a switch and the SDN controller to 
sniff that traffic.  
By identifying the correct OpenFlow packets, the attacker could tamper the packets to 
forge the packets themselves, make flow rules for these tampered packets to forward them 
to unintended destinations and make them inaccurate to hide malicious actions in the SDN 
network.  
The SDN controller could query statistics to make sure that its flow table configurations are 
functioning as expected. This query could be malformed and actual statistics may not be 
the actual ones. The rogue switch could send inaccurate statistics for the SDN controller, 
and it does not have a way to know whether the statistics are correct or incorrect. The 
possibility to falsify statistics can open a path for other alterations of traffic in the SDN 
network. 
Another purpose of the identification of the statistics packets is to enable packet 
tampering. Tampering the values inside the packets transporting statistics would create a 
situation where a rogue switch could send falsified values inside the statistics packets 
towards the SDN controller. The aim of tampered packets is to complicate and obfuscate 
the monitoring of the traffic what is going on between certain switches, which would 
enable lying to the SDN controller. The SDN controller does not currently have a way or tool 
to handle the statistics. The handling means evaluating the accuracy of the packet payload 
and taking actions based on inaccuracies of the SDN network traffic. The SDN controller 
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does not have means either to act upon if there was a mismatch in the packet counts; 
neither are there rules or instructions for the SDN controller how to handle the 
mismatches. Why does the statistics in generic need to be reliable? Because it is in the basis 
of networking to trust the traffic statistics, and the SDN controller blindly trusts the 
statistics response from a switch in the current SDN protocol implementation. One more 
purpose for a malicious intent could be that a switch sends packets to another destination 
than intended, possibly even to another tenant’s network if possible.  
The verification scenario expects that the attacker has gained access to the SDN network, 
especially on the switch. As an administrator, the traffic during the statistics query is 
observed and captured from the management server with a graphical desktop. The 
management server has an interface configured in the SDN network. To enable the traffic 
capture with the graphical user interface on the switch, SSH with X11 forwarding towards it 
as a root is commenced.  
ssh -X <target>  
ssh -X  root@172.16.0.104 
 
The connection to switch is intentionally setup with in unsecure X11 forwarding as it 
enables the remote host to “access the local X11 display through the forwarded 
connection.” (SSH Config Linux Man Page 2013.) The unsecure X11 forwarding also enables 
the possibility to do keystroke monitoring; however, this opportunity is not in the scope of 
this verification scenario. Using the insecure communications is also the worst-case 
scenario of poor security to enable attacks and shows that regardless of the solution 
considered very unsecure, it is in use still and could be exploited with malicious intent. 
On the switch SW4, a query about port statistics is done with the command showing a 
snapshot of all ports statistics on the SW4. 
ovs-ofctl dump-ports <netdev> 
ovs-ofctl dump-ports -O openflow13 of-switch 
 
The figure below (Figure 21) is the output of ovs-ofctl dump-ports. It is used as a reference 
to find the correct packet in the traffic capture and possibly determine the payload of the 
packet as well. To see the payload in clear text would also help to determine that the data 
in the packet could be tampered with a suitable tool. 
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The traffic is captured from the eth0 on the SW4. The packet info for the port statistics 
request-reply -pair is  
OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST or 
OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY for OFPMP_PORT_STATS 
 
The request-reply pair was identified when monitoring the output capture while giving the 
ovs-ofctl command on the SW4. 
Figure 21. Output of ovs-ofctl dump-ports -command. 
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Confirming the correct packet from the capture against command output is described next. 
The command output shows statistics for all ports on the SW4 (Figure 22 below). 
 
The capture of network traffic shows two packets with info including PORT_STATS, based 
on that a closer observation of the packets is done. The request part of the query is coming 
from the SDN controller towards the switch and the payload shows the details of the 
request packet’s payload (Figure 23 below). The entire packet contents can be found in the 
Appendix 5 (Ovs-ofcli port statistics command capture, request packet, 1st query.). 
Next is observed in detail the reply packet of the port statistics query. The figure (Figure 23) 
below shows the packet payload. 
Figure 22. Ovs-ofctl dump-ports command output. 
Figure 23. Statistics request packet payload. 
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The comparison of the ovs-ofcli command output and packet payload confirms that the 
output and packet payload with info OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_PORT_STATS are 
adequately uniform to make a conclusion that a certain command can be tied to a certain 
capture. The comparison was done in detail for the whole output and packet payload, here 
only described in detail for the port 1 for clarity. There are differences with values (blue 
boxes in Figure 24). The aim in this verification was to identify the correct packet and not 
investigate further the differences between transmit values. The second query verification 
cycle showed that the values are more uniform (Appendix 4 Ovs-ofcli port statistics 
command capture, request packet, 1st query). Later, in the subchapter 4.4.3 Lying to the 
SDN Controller, the results and a more careful packet inspection will prove that the 
statistics command output and capture are exactly uniform. To verify uniform values 
Figure 24. Port statistics reply packet payload. 
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requires going back chronologically in the long capture output to find the correct packet as 
the previously mentioned subchapter will describe. 
Respectively, there is a possibility to view packet and bytes statistics for the flows. The 
finest granularity of the flow statistics can be reached by defining in or out port set to the 
flow rule. When defining the flow, for this command the flow translates into a specific flow 
entry field, such as in_port or table. 
ovs-ofctl dump-flows <switch> <flow> 
ovs-ofctl -O openflow13 dump-flows of-switch in_port=2 
 
Without the flow definition, the output of command prints all the flow tables which have 
flow rules.  
ovs-ofctl dump-flows <switch>  
ovs-ofctl -O openflow13 dump-flows of-switch 
 
To output the flow rules in a certain table, a flow parameter is defined within a table value 
pair. With default flow table this would result in the same output as the previous command. 
ovs-ofctl dump-flows <switch> <flow> 
ovs-ofctl -O openflow13 dump-flows of-switch table=0 
 
With dump-aggregate command a summary on packets and bytes is printed for the 
respective port or table. 
ovs-ofctl -O openflow13 dump-aggregate of-switch in_port=2 
ovs-ofctl -O openflow13 dump-aggregate of-switch table=0 
 
 
The packet types for the flow statistics are the same as for the port statistics in case a flow 
ID is given as in_port or out_port -value;  
OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST and  
OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY for OFPMP_PORT_STATS 
 
For the flow statistics, the packet request-reply -pairs are named as  
OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST and  
OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY for OFPMP_FLOW 
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4.4.3 Lying to the SDN Controller 
The main idea in this subchapter is to study the possibility to lie convincingly to an SDN 
controller. The objective of lying could be to obfuscate the SDN controller during data 
exfiltration by redirecting communication packets to other hosts than the intended ones. 
The purpose of this could be to modify packets in malicious intent and retransmit them 
back to the sender or relay them yet to another hosts. The main rationale is to effectively 
control switches or a subset of them without alerting the SDN controller monitoring 
capabilities.   
If an attacker gains administrator access to one or several switches, there is a possibility to 
manipulate the flow tables and the rules in the flow entries, which gives the attacker full 
charge of the traffic sent via the switch. In this situation, the SDN controller is aware of the 
traffic rule changes. In addition to monitoring flow tables, the SDN controller can observe 
the port ingress and egress traffic on the switch (monitoring the traffic amount that pass 
through the interfaces). Based on the previous considerations, following assumptions are 
made: 
• The SDN controller has a mechanism for interrogating the switches it controls, the 
statistics about the current traffic passing through  
• The SDN controller is actively (at least at certain time intervals) sampling these 
statistics from the switches 
• The monitoring that SDN controller does is performed somewhere above the it, for 
example by security applications residing on top of the Northbound APIs.  
• Cross-referencing the traffic with the other switches it controls, to see if the traffic 
amounts that enter and leave the switches match the structure of the switch fabric 
• Verifying whether the ingress and egress traffic statistics from the switches match 
each other. E.g. that the traffic statistics for Switch2, in the Figure, are matching that 
of Switches 1,3,4,5;  
• As an attacker, one way to defeat this monitoring is then to convincingly lie to the 
SDN controller, to fool the monitoring, by giving credible traffic statistics to match as 
well as the possible values expected by the monitoring solution on top of the SDN 
controller. 
 
In this work, the intention is not go as far as attack towards the SDN architecture, but 
merely try to prove that it is possible to actively lie to the SDN controller, given a 
compromised switch (or a set of them) within reasonable extend to prove malicious 
intentions on the compromised switch. Compromising a switch in the SDN network basically 
allows full management of the SDN controller as all the OpenFlow commands are available 
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via the switch. The SDN controller can be reached via SSH from the switch. If an attacker is 
able to configure their own management device in the SDN network, the SSH access is 
certainly available for all the SDN network devices as it is enabled by default. 
The flow table modifications on a switch in the SDN architecture can be used as a form of 
lying to the SDN controller. The lying to the SDN controller can mean that in the flow table 
the destination of a certain packet is changed with flow rules. A specific protocol, port or IP 
address can be the variable in the flow rule (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5 2015, 63.) 
monitoring, the intention of which is to forward data to an unintended destination for 
tampering.  
Making it harder for the SDN controller to fix possible errors in the SDN network traffic, 
creating a flow rule without proper ID can assist in that. The SDN controller cannot change a 
flow rule as it has a distinct identifier. By defining the flow rule with missing values, the 
attacker can ensure that the SDN controller cannot change the flow rule easily or at all. If 
the flow rule does not have a proper ID it cannot be easily removed because identifying the 
rule is impossible. Due to this incompatible rule, the removal of the whole default flow 
table or booting the SDN controller might be needed to resume to default behavior and 
default flow table.   
The port statistics queries from a switch towards the SDN controller are clarified in section 
4.4.2. Statistics Packets Identification. The switch sends a request to SDN controller for the 
statistics and gets a reply where the port statistics are in the packet payload. In this section, 
it is observed how the SDN controller is handling the request-reply -pair. The statistics 
request is sent from DLUX UI to query port statistics of SW4 (Figure 25 below). At the same 
time, the network capture is running to collect the communication between the two 
devices.  
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The corresponding reply-request -pair in the capture was identified based on the values 
shows in the DLUX UI for the openflow:4 device which is the SW4. The values were uniform. 
However, the latest port statistics packet capture chronologically was not the correct 
packet but the sixth when going back the capture. This clarifies the inaccuracy of values in 
subchapter 4.4.2 Statistics Packets Identification regarding the non-uniform values; the 
inspected packet was incorrect.  
In the table below (Table 5), the command output in DLUX UI and packet capture is 
compared. It shows that the values are indeed consistent, there are no remaining packets 
within the calculations (command output minus packet capture values). The detailed reply 
packet data can be found in Appendix 9 (DLUX UI port statistics command reply capture, 
3rd query). 
Figure 25. DLUX UI output of SW4 statistics query. 
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Based on the capture data, it can be concluded that the request-reply pair has always the 
same direction: the SDN controller asks from a switch for the port statistics. This means 
that the SDN controller itself has no other means but to ask from the switch, it does not 
preserve values for comparison. This makes it harder for the SDN controller to know 
whether a switch lies to it or not about the statistics values. Based on the capture, the SDN 
controller makes the statistics queries frequently, not only by request (Appendix 9 Network 
capture during statistics query via DLUX UI, 3rd query). During the verification run, the 
capture is started and then in the DLUX UI the command is given. The actions take ca. 20 
seconds. In this snapshot, the SDN controller sent altogether over 400 packets. Out of 
those, there were 19 statistics request-reply pairs. This highlights the continuous sending of 
port statistics queries by the SDN controller.  
Now after confirming the statistics packet type and info, its contents and its accuracy, the 
next step is to enable lying to the controller. The next step is to modify statistics packet’s 
destination in the flow table by a flow rule. The experiment will show if one or more rules 
are needed to implement the new destination forward.   
The known information about the packet to be tampered by the attacker is the protocol 
type which is OpenFlow. The packet type is also known based on the detailed packet 
capture analysis in chapter 4.4.2 Statistics Packets Identification: 
OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST or OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY for OFPMP_PORT_STAT. It is yet 
to be evaluated which of the packets is to be re-directed, request or reply. When an SDN 
Table 5. Command output and packet capture comparison, 3rd query. 
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controller sends a query about the statistics, should that query be forwarded to the 
attacker as a piece of information that the SDN controller is making such a request? Based 
on that request, the attacker would know that the reply packet needs to be modified to lie 
to the SDN controller, or that the reply sent should be tampered. But, does the attacker 
tamper all the packets? The assumption is made that the reply packets need to be 
modified. Otherwise when returning to the actual payload replies with different values than 
the modified ones, it may be more confusing and thus rise suspicion in case statistics are 
collected via the API for application purposes. Statistics collected via API would require an 
analysis and monitoring of the results, which is assumed to be the purpose of the statistics 
application, and hence, making a conclusion that all the statistics replies should be 
tampered starting from the takeover by the attacker.  
The attacker would have generated or falsified the ongoing traffic; especially destination 
changes to another port and IP would create unexpected traffic values for the port 
statistics.  
The SDN controller would be monitoring the output statistics of one switch to see that they 
match with the other switch’s input statistics. Lying to the SDN controller in this scenario 
would occur in the way that the output statistics of SW4 port X towards the SW3 port X are 
tampered. Port Xs are the ports tied to the interfaces connecting the two switches in the 
SDN network.  
To lie to the SDN controller, the flow table modifications can be done by defining the flow 
rules. The types of flow rule definitions can be adding, modifying or deleting. The flow rules 
are defined using the flow modification function (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5 2015, 
43). When adding a flow rule, it can be dominant if not overlapping with other rules in the 
flow table. Overlap checking can also be disabled with flow modification flag 
OFPFF_CHECK_OVERLAP (Op. cit. 81). By setting the flag value to 1 it disables the checking 
of overlaps and adding new flow entries will overwrite the existing ones (Op. cit. 43). The 
attacker may use this feature to overwrite rules to make them work for malicious intents to 
obfuscate the SDN controller and provide inaccurate port statistic values.  
The port statistics collection can be disabled by setting the flow modification flags 
NO_PKT_COUNTS and NO_BYT_COUNTS (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5 2015, 81). 
Resetting the counters can also work for malicious intents as the SDN controller will lose 
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the track of traffic traversing via the switches ports. Resetting the counters is one of the 
flow modification flags. It is called RESET_COUNTS and when the flag is set, packet and byte 
counters for port statistics are cleared (Op. cit. 81). The attacker can lead on the SDN 
controller by resetting the counters and the SDN controller will not have any objections to 
that as it trusts the configurations and settings coming from the presumable reliable switch. 
Managing the packet destination based on the packet info, i.e. changing the packet 
destination based on the OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST or OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY values, 
is experimented next. The aim is to tamper the packet by changing the reply payload, i.e. 
statistics values. The packets can be altered with a suitable tool, such as Scapy. Editcap tool 
can be used to create new traffic from the existing capture files. 
By defining a certain packet number, the Editcap tool usually removes the packet (Sharpe 
n.d.); however, now the intention is just to save specific packets to be re-transmitted to the 
SDN network and observe the impacts. With the parameter -r the packet selection can be 
reversed, and the defined packets will be saved to output file to be sent (Op. cit.) in the 
figure below (Figure 26).  
            editcap -r   <infile> <outfile> <packet#-packet#> 
            editcap -r dumpFlowsByFlowTable.pcapng 2port_stats_chop.pcapng 295-296 
 
 
Before sending the packets, the identification of re-transmitted packets needs to be 
ensured. With parameter -a, a comment string can be added to a packet with certain frame 
number (Sharpe n.d.). Comment string is used to identify the correct packets in the new 
capture made during the sending of the generated capture. 
editcap -a <1:comment> -a <2:comment> <infile> <outfile> 
editcap -a 1:mod_request -a 2:mod_reply 2port_stats.pcapng_ 
2port_stats_comment.pcapng 
 
Figure 26. Contents of a new packet capture file created from a previous capture. 
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However, the comment feature was not supported in the SDN Test Bed Editcap tool version 
1.12.1, hence, the Scapy tool is used to edit the payload data to directly reach the desired 
outcome of sending falsified data to the controller.  
The pcapng file created with editcap includes two extracted packets. Those packets are 
loaded to Scapy tool’s Python editor. The file which contains the extracted packets is loaded 
to a variable p for packet. 
variable=rdpcap(“path”) 
>>> p=rdpcap("/home/administrator/2port_stats.pcap") 
 
The output example shows the contents of the first packet, the request packet for port 
statistics in the Scapy format. The variable p is shown formatted with function show() for 
clarity in the figure below (Figure 27). The source (src) and destination (dst)  IP addresses 
are highlighted to indicate the port statistics communication direction, where the controller 
asks the switch for the port statistics. The lowest rectangle in the figure shows the payload 
in hex format. 
Figure 27. Packet output in Scapy. 
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The payload of the packet is modified next with the Scapy tool. First, the contents of the 
packet are read into variable rawload (Figure 28 below). 
 
The modification of the payload is done by assigning a new value to the rawload variable 
(Figure 29 below). The output of the variable is as modified. 
 
The changes are saved with write function, wrpcap writes files in pcap format. Variable p 
for packet contains the original packet with payload changes. 
wrpcap("<path>",<data>) 
>>> wrpcap("/home/administrator/2port_stats_modload.pcap",p) 
 
The newly created pcap file with modified packet payload can be opened in Scapy with 
Wireshark (<data>) command.  
>>> wireshark(p) 
 
The packet could not be opened with Wireshark capture tool for further inspection due to 
an error notification (Wireshark tool pop-up error notification): “The capture file appears to 
be damaged or corrupt. (libpcap: IrDA capture has a packet with an invalid sll_protocol 
field)”. This bug has been identified and according to Scapy's Exported Linux Cooked-mode, 
The Capture Doesn’t Open in Wireshark (2015) and there are restrictions in usage with 
Wireshark and IP pcap files:  
Figure 28. Load payload to a variable rawload in scapy. 
Figure 29. Modify payload with Scapy. 
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Please remember that Wireshark works with Layer 2 packets (usually called 
"frames"). So an Ether() header was added to the ICMP packets. Passing just IP 
packets (layer 3) to Wireshark will give strange results. 
This finding can be applied to TCP packets as well. There is a workaround to create an 
Ethernet header artificially to the packet (Op. cit.). These further actions to add the 
Ethernet header to TCP packets are not in the scope of the master’s thesis, as the theory of 
modifying the packets can be adequately confirmed with previous example. 
The SDN controller may have difficulties in deleting a flow rule if it has been originally 
defined with inadequate parameters. Making the removal hard or inconvenient with 
generic flow rules is also a way to restrict SDN controller’s ability to delete a flow rule. To 
increase these hardships on the SDN controller side, no new flow table is created for the 
verification but the default flow table is used to add flow rules. The Openflow protocol 
allows adding flow rules without a cookie ID. In that case, the cookie will get a default value 
0x0. There can be many rules with that same cookie, and if other fields are also generic it is 
difficult to direct the delete actions to a certain flow rule. The protocol also allows to define 
flows without priority field. It is one of the distinct identifiers in a flow rule. If it is not 
defined, the flow rule is difficult to delete without proper identifiers or distinct fields which 
would separate it from other flow rules. 
In the worst-case scenario, the whole flow table with the misconfigured flow rule needs to 
be deleted to resume normal functionality. If the flow rule is in default flow table, usually 
flow table 0, the deletion would require to delete it. After deleting the default flow table 
there would be no flow tables. How would that affect the SDN network? To see the effects 
of deleting the default flow table, a trial run is executed and the consequences of removal 
are reviewed.  
On the SW4 Ping is started towards the SDN controller to see the possible connection 
disconnects after deleting the default flow table 0. Network traffic capture on the switch is 
also started to monitor the traffic in the SDN network in detail. The flow table modification 
command with delete option is run on the switch. The command is for deleting a flow is 
according to Open vSwitch Manual 2.6.90 (n.d., chapter OpenFlow Switch Flow Table 
Commands):  
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ovs-ofctl del-flows <bridge> <flow> 
ovs-ofctl del-flows -O openflow13 of-switch 0 
 
All the flows can be deleted by not defining the flow parameter (Op. cit.). There are no 
other flow tables defined currently but still the parameter 0 is given to the ovs-ofctl 
command to make sure of the deletion target. Defining a specific flow for the command 
does not succeed with the OpenFlow version 2.3.0 on the Open vSwitch. Hence adjusting 
the command and leaving out the flow definition. Now the command is successful and 
there are no flow tables defined any longer. This was verified with the dump-flows 
command. During the scenario, the ping did not stop running. The default flow table had 
very permissive flow rules hence the removal of it did not make an effect on the 
connectivity. In the network traffic capture, there was not anything out of ordinary. The 
query regarding the flows before executing the deletion showed the flows as expected and 
vice versa after deletion there were no payload in the flow table replies regarding the flow 
entries. Somehow disturbing is however the fact that communication between the SDN 
controller and switch continues in a very permissive manner and the OpenFlow commands 
can still be executed. 
4.5 Analysis of Verification 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the feasibility of compromising the SDN 
controller. Compromising the SDN controller via a switch is possible in theory. Directly 
compromising the SDN controller does not necessarily require a more complex 
configuration than the first phase configuration: a host could be directly connected to a 
switch which is connected to Internet (RGCE). If an attacker gains the IP address of any 
networking device in the SDN architecture, it would also lead to the possibility of 
compromising the interface towards the SDN controller. 
Compromising the SDN controller is not required to gain extensive management 
permissions and possibilities in an SDN network. A switch configured in the SDN network 
can add, modify and delete flow rules from a flow table without any specific reaction by an 
SDN controller. Deleting a default flow table did not make disturbance in the simple host 
reachability traffic with ping. But it was alarming at the same time as the traffic was not 
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affected; the networking continues without the SDN controller managing it with flow table 
rules.  
If an attacker gains access to the switch, the access to see the Control Channel IP of the 
switch is possible. With ovs-ofctl CLI the attacker can request SDN controller connection 
details and see the SDN controller Control Channel IP. When this IP is available, then there 
are again attack possibilities towards the SDN controller. The attacker may experiment with 
password cracking tools to find service related credentials. Also, the web server running on 
the SDN controller and its provided DLUX UI is available for the attacker. If the 
administrator neglects to change default password, the attacker can gain full access to the 
SDN controller via DLUX UI. The default password is common knowledge in the 
configuration guidelines and thus, easily available and also the address of web service is 
included in the guidelines. 
5 Threat Mitigation Conclusions 
This chapter proposes actions to take before a vulnerability becomes a threat. The 
mitigations are evaluated based on the research and verification outcome of this master’s 
thesis, which also addresses the actions to take to mitigate the possible threats when they 
may already have taken effect. 
5.1 Secure by Design 
The SDN architecture has possibilities to improve security, and security should be 
addressed already in the design phase. Security could be built-in by default. As discussed in 
chapter 2.4 Security in SDN, the basic security hardening features should be enforced. The 
transport protocol should be encrypted by default with TLS, and the encryption decision 
should not be left to the network administrator make. There is no question if the security is 
needed; as the OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5 (2015, 36) states, it is needed. 
The highly valuable features of SDN architecture such as centralized management and 
programmable API may pose severe threats.  In the centralized management, a 
compromised SDN controller may make the whole network vulnerable and affect its 
functionality. The programmable API interface may leave open interfaces for an attacker to 
exploit. For these possible vulnerabilities, the security enhanced extensions of SDN, FortNox 
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and SE-Floodlight, present solutions which should be built-in for all SDN distributions. The 
role based authentication can have multiple layers, which by priority secure and allow 
access for different actors in SDN architecture. For human actors accessing the SDN 
controller settings, the highest level of priority in authentication is given. An application 
implemented with programmable API may have secure or in-secure actor status, and based 
on that, the priority of authentication is set to medium or low. The priority is then 
considered in the context of conflict resolution scheme by evaluating the effects of actions 
with regard to higher priority actor actions (Porras et al. 2012, 3). The low priority actors 
could be restricted outside the SDN controller process (SDN Security Suite 2015). Role-
based authentication with layers according to FortNOX Secure SDN extension could be 
included in design phase.  
The security enhanced SDN architecture solutions provide security extensions. There should 
not be extensions but built-in security features, which are enforced and the usage of SDN 
network is to be restricted without those security features. 
5.2 Computer and Operating System Security 
In this chapter computer and OS security aspects are considered as possibilities to harden 
the security of SDN architecture. SDN architecture itself has possibilities to be secure to a 
certain degree: 
If an attacker has found a host and its vulnerabilities, then it is likely that the flow 
created for the attack was successful (i.e. the attack comes from a trusted source). In 
this situation, SDN has little to do since its main operations are on the lower layers (2 
and 3). (Abdalla 2014, 24.) 
The virtual devices in SDN architecture in this research are based on Linux distros and so 
the OS security facet is concentrating on Linux OS hardening possibilities. The basis of 
secure OS is patching OS, security hardening, additional security controls and testing 
according to Scarfone, Jansen & Tracy (2008b, 25). Out-of-date OS modules may contain 
vulnerabilities which can be exploited by attackers. Also, in the patching or update context 
the removal of unnecessary services, applications and network protocols and configuration 
of OS user authentication are a vital part of secure configuration of a device (Scarfone et al. 
2008b, 26). Additional security controls at minimum should include anti-malware SW, 
Intrusion Detection (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention (IPS), firewalls and patch management 
65 
 
 
(Scarfone et al. 2008b, 30). With these tools, possible attacks are detected, their impacts 
are mitigated and prevented in an up-to-date device. Testing these security measures gives 
proof of their implementation rationale and also reveals possible additional security 
measure needs in case of faults found during testing or simulated attacks. 
5.3 OpenFlow Protocol Security Hardening 
The OpenFlow protocol has clearly good intentions on leaving possibilities for 
implementation to affect the system configurations quite extensively. The unfortunate 
outcome of these chances of making administrational tasks easier or stressing the SDN 
system less, is making the solution vulnerable.  
The usage of non-supporting TLS SDN controller allows unauthenticated access. There 
should be no option for configuring the SDN network without TLS enabled (Openflow 
Protocol Library:User Guide n.d.). The enabling of secure communications does not require 
many steps: key certificate generation or using exemplary keys, uncommenting the TLS-tag 
in the OpenFlow protocol library configuration file and configuring the virtual machine to 
use those generated or exemplary keys. Public and private key pairs can be created with 
ovs-pki command for the SDN controller and switches (OpenDaylight OpenFlow Plugin: TLS 
Support n.d.). The chain of trust consists of intermediate PKCS12 SDN controller key store 
and switch key store containing private and public keys. The key stores are made available 
in OpenDaylight installation folder (Op. cit.). Next the OpenFlow protocol library 
configuration file is modified as discussed earlier in this paragraph. Now the system should 
be ready for secure communication. 
The failures in configuration commands and queries may be caused by OpenFlow version 
mismatch. The administrator needs to be fully aware of the version of resources in SDN 
network, otherwise no configurations take effect.  The handshake message is a feature 
request from the SDN controller towards a switch. The handshake states the SDN controller 
what the switch’s basic functionalities are (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 76). 
Without a successful handshake, there will be a handshake failure which prevents 
communication session initiation in the Control Channel between the SDN controller and a 
switch. 
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When setting up the communication between the SDN controller and a switch, the mode of 
recovering from the connection interrupt may make the SDN network vulnerable. “In fail-
standalone mode, the switch owns the flow tables and flow entries” (OpenFlow Switch 
Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 174). When the parameter is not defined when configuring the 
communication between the SDN controller and the switch with command ovs-ofctl set 
controller, the default value, i.e. the fail secure mode is a safer option. With the default 
parameter, the switch tries to reconnect to the SDN controller in a connection failure 
situation. During the reconnect the packets towards the SDN controller are dropped and 
flow entries expire gracefully after their flow entries timeouts have passed. In the fail 
standalone mode, the switch starts to act as a legacy switch and has total control over the 
flow tables. (Op. cit. 38.)  
The configuration error possibility is present and can cause vulnerabilities when enabling 
features. When modifying flows, there are potential ways to affect the SDN networking 
negatively. Hard timeout is one parameter of flow modification actions. Hard_timeout 
defines along with idle_timeout how long a flow entry keeps flow rules active (OpenFlow 
Switch Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 80). Setting the hard_timeout to zero means that the flow 
entry is permanent (Op. cit. 21) and in case of SDN controller disconnect the unnecessary or 
malicious flow entry may keep on forwarding traffic. 
The administrator’s level of technical knowledge is vital to keep up-to-date, and security 
policy may help with enforcing to plan and implement secure configurations. 
The enumeration of flow modifications flags shows possibilities in configuring flows without 
collecting statistics for packets or bytes. Also, creating overlapping flow entries may be 
possible if the check for the feature CHECK_OVERLAP is disabled. A malicious user may take 
advantage of RESET_COUNTS and obfuscate the SDN controller by resetting a counter for 
packets and bytes. The counters for packets (NO_PKTS_COUNT) and bytes 
(NO_BYT_COUNTS) in the switch can be disabled, and when the SDN controller requests for 
statistics, there is none. (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5. 2015, 81.) 
5.4 Layers of Security 
There are many possibilities to carry out security attacks. The ways can be considered as 
layers depending on the different attack vectors reaching different levels of the system. The 
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following layered security example refers to Shenk (2013, 5). An authorized usage of assets 
remains as the main control target. However, there are often privilege issues overlooked 
regardless of continuous addressing of the issue. A basic authorization assurance such as a 
default password and strong password usage and missing privilege levels, i.e. groups, is still 
often dismissed.  
The secure configuration on networking devices, laptops and mobile etc. devices requires 
security hardenings to be done. The level of device hardening should start already from the 
boot sector by enabling disk encryption to prevent unauthorized access to data and 
hardening the boot loader with authentication. The Operating System level security 
hardening can be reached by actively taking care of patching, disabling unnecessary 
services and user account, and also making sure that only authorized processes are running 
in the system. The physical ports and networking interfaces prevent unauthorized access 
with adequate authentication. 
Previously only two layers were discussed in detail, and multiple items were already 
identified to address in layered security. While layers are expected to slow down the 
attacker, monitoring and thus detecting the attack on different layers is crucial. Detection 
may come afterwards; however, if it can be done in reasonable timeframe after the attack, 
the attacker steps may still be available, for example in the logs. 
5.5 Physical Security 
However virtualized and software-defined, SDN architecture runs on physical HW 
resources. The HW resources should be protected with layers of security. According to 
Hobbs (2016), it is good to consider the security perimeter concept in order to build 
protective guards around the possibly vulnerable target: site perimeter, building perimeter, 
building interior and the target itself. All the layers together aim at preventing unauthorized 
access to target and also a theft or injure of the hedged item. 
The threats towards the hedged item, in this case the SDN architecture, may consist of 
physical tampering of the networking devices or breaking cables between the devices. 
Hence, the cables should be protected and preferably the SDN architecture related devices 
stored behind locked doors if physically available. 
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The physical locks may also hinder malware installations via external devices. In case of an 
external device attached to device, the BIOS settings may help in preventing to run the 
malware. In the BIOS settings, the booting from and running external devices can be 
disabled (Protect Your Information from Physical Threats n.d, chapter Software and Settings 
Related to Physical Security). Another layer of security in the SDN ensemble can be added 
by defining secure password for BIOS as well. 
5.6 Testing and Evaluating the Security 
A testing and evaluation conducted in continuous or regular intervals ensure the 
functionality of the security controls.  
(Security) Testing involves hands-on work with systems and networks to identify 
security vulnerabilities and can be executed across an entire enterprise or on selected 
systems. (Scarfone, Souppaya, Cody & Orebaugh 2008a, 15).  
The vulnerability scanning and penetration testing tools are used in security testing. They 
will indicate possible vulnerabilities in a controlled environment that could be exploited by 
attackers. Testing also gathers input to evaluate the compliance of security hardening 
actions such as patch management and password policy according to Scarfone et al. (2008a, 
15). 
6 Discussion 
The discussion chapter gathers the tenets learned during the research and verification 
phases of this master’s thesis. While going back to the beginning of the research, there was 
only an interest to learn more about the newish networking technology. Today, when the 
master’s thesis is closing to its end in the form of this discussion, a lot more is known about 
the topic. The master’s thesis research has deepened and built a solid networking 
knowledge base. Also many questions have risen, or those could be called further research 
ideas; they will be addressed in the later chapter 6.5. Future Research.  
Where does the ultimate feeling of understanding a subject or its fundamentals come 
from? Frail sensations of it in the course of the research may suggest that it seems to be 
curiosity and prowess to question the purpose of a statement or a solution in this case. A 
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solution refers here to a feature, and the courage in questioning a feature in the OpenFlow 
protocol which could leave the architecture vulnerable.  
When considering the identified threats by Slavov et al. (2016), to start off the threat 
landscape is wide and the legacy networking threats apply to the SDN solutions as well. The 
identified threats are on a higher level than which this master’s thesis concentrated on. The 
OpenFlow protocol implementation and configuring the SDN network had possibilities to 
make the SDN solution secure, and also it gave a chance to make it vulnerable. The latter 
possibility was exploited in this master’s thesis’ verification scenarios. 
The vulnerability exploits started already in setting up the control channel between the SDN 
controller and a switch. The secure communication settings with TLS were disregarded and 
switch connectivity recovery actions were disabled. These unsecure configurations were 
used because it was possible. There were also ways to make the SDN flow table and its 
rules difficult to modify or remove. That possibility was utilized when predicting the attack 
vectors an attacker may have and in preventing the attacker to exploit them. The details of 
flow table configurations are discussed later in chapter 6.2 OpenFlow Protocol 
Exploitability. The discussion especially targets to the Lying to the SDN Controller -scenario 
aspect. 
The SDN controller trusts the replies it receives from a switch. Hence the attack vector of 
compromising the SDN controller was prospective via a switch in the SDN solution. If an 
attacker gains access to a switch, there is no question in compromising the SDN controller. 
It will be possible as they have communication channel configured between the SDN 
controller and switch(es). The communication channel is especially vulnerable if the TLS is 
not configured for it. The trust mentioned in the beginning of this paragraph also refers to 
the fact that is not necessary to compromise the controller as it is enough to compromise a 
switch. The switch was capable of running OpenFlow commands via CLI, those commands 
are the same as SDN controller uses to manage the SDN network. 
The essence of the SDN architecture being the centralized control, it may enable 
compromising the SDN controller. That then may endanger the functionality of the entire 
network.  Programmability via an API enables the implementation of innovative 
applications; however, it also leaves an open interface for the malicious applications. 
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The attacker mindset understanding was used in ethical hacking during the verification 
phase. The purpose was to find fixes for the possible vulnerabilities, not to exploit them. 
Also, the ethical hacking was made use of by trying to prevent the exploits by considering 
mitigations for the them. 
This research may have useful input for the SDN Test Bed which was an outcome of the 
Cyber Trust project’s earlier phase. The SDN Test Bed administrators could benefit from the 
actual usage experience of a non-simulated SDN network, usage of the OpenDaylight 
controller, its enhanced features in GUI and its ability to provide actual networking 
administration. The GUI features may not yet provide all the configuration possibilities 
available, but it can be concluded that the GUI is stable enough for its current intended 
usage. The YANG UI part of the GUI is unfortunately still relying on RESTful API commands 
which are unnecessarily complex to administer the network. The topology view, however, is 
especially informative providing an overview of the SDN network’s networking devices and 
hosts connected to those networking devices. The OpenFlow implementation in the Open 
vSwitches (version 2.3. 0), in the form of CLI, is more versatile for the network 
administration than the GUI at the moment.  
To answer the questions whether the SDN controller is vulnerable, yes, it is. It trusts too 
much in the communication with a switch in the SDN solution. A switch can use the 
OpenFlow protocol commands in similar manner as an SDN controller as was observed in 
the Lying to the Controller scenario and especially in its flow configuration part.  How 
serious those SDN vulnerabilities are? Very serious in the hand of a malicious user. The 
malicious user has a way to manage the SDN network entirely with the OpenFlow 
commands on a switch. Mitigations to these vulnerabilities can be done with secure design, 
security hardenings for the OS, processes and SW and OpenFlow protocol hardenings as 
was outlined in chapter 5 Threat Mitigation Conclusions. 
In the following chapters, the most intriguing findings regarding the vulnerabilities are 
discussed.  
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6.1 Unsecure Default Settings 
The SSH is enabled by default, and this becomes an issue if an attacker gains access to the 
SDN network. However, the credentials need to be cracked prior to the usage of SSH 
communications but it is assumed to be fundamentally easy for an experienced attacker.  
In the architecture, there are no security features enabled by default. The packets are 
transmitted unencrypted in the SDN network. There is a security module available; 
however, as it is not mandatory or default module in the distro, an administrator may 
decide not to configure it. The reasons for not configuring the security module could be 
ignorance, difficulty or plain malicious intent due to grudge or possible financial gain. 
6.2 OpenFlow Protocol Exploitability  
In this master’s thesis, the different aspect in finding threats was to drill down the SDN 
switch and OpenFlow protocol specification and trying to find possible ways to exploit their 
features. Suitable features regarding the flow statistics in exploiting them in malicious 
intent are CHECK_OVERLAP, RESET_COUNTS, NO_PKT_COUNTS, NO_BYT_COUNTS in the 
ofp_flow_mod_flags enumeration. The aim in configuring these is to confuse the SDN 
controller by not checking overlapping flow entries, resetting counters during active 
networking and not collecting packet or byte count of a flow entry. Similar obfuscating 
configurations can additionally be done by not updating the status of flows in case of 
expiration or deletion. That can be done by setting the flag for OFPFF_SEND_FLOW_REM to 
zero. (OpenFlow Switch Specification 1.3.5 2015, 81.) 
6.3 Mitigation 
The security starts with careful planning of the security needs and policies and from 
engagement to provide security to all the personnel. “Many server security and 
performance problems can be traced to a lack of planning or management controls.” 
(Scarfone et al. 2008a, 17.) When planning the security policies, information storage, 
services, user privileges and authentication, traffic filtering, skilled personnel and physical 
security aspects are considered. In a company, there should be clear division of responsible 
persons and responsibilities on the security functions implementing the security policies. 
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6.4 Networking Change Effects 
The future of networking will include many more devices (IoT and related sensors), 
applications and machine-to-machine connections needing resources. The networking 
bandwidth requirements will increase as there will be multi-vendor multi-device multi-
network distributed environment requirements. 
6.5 Future Research 
In the future research, especially the attack scenarios could be further studied. With more 
intense concentration on a specific scenario, an attack would be expected to succeed. The 
success in attacking the SDN network would complement this research greatly.  
Implementing and experimenting with a statistics application would bring alive the original 
research dilemma on how the lying to the SDN controller actually goes. This master’s thesis’ 
results could be utilized in that research to tackle the already known obstacles. 
The enablers of unsecure SDN network, especially the administrative configurations, flow 
and statistics collection findings could be used in the further security enhancements of the 
SDN protocol and architecture. 
An interesting research aspect would also be to investigate the resource restrictions and 
experiment how the memory strain could affect the related processes. For example, if 
memory is low on a virtual resource, how well will the Open vSwitch process on a switch 
handle that situation and will it terminate spontaneously and what are the effects of that 
action. By defining and setting the thresholds to monitor the memory usage and acting 
upon those threshold events would complement the resource strain scenario as well. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1. REST API Commands 
SW4 port2 where a host is connected to: 
http://172.16.0.15:8181/restconf/operational/opendaylight-
inventory:nodes/node/openflow:4/node-connector/openflow:4:2/opendaylight-port-
statistics:flow-capable-node-connector-statistics 
With authentication with curl command: 
curl -i -u admin:admin -X GET http://172.16.0.15:8181/restconf/operational/opendaylight-
inventory:nodes/node/openflow:4/node-connector/openflow:4:2/opendaylight-port-statistics:flow-
capable-node-connector-statistics 
Appendix 2. Statistics collection scripts. 
The script (get_stats.sh) is used to collect statistics from all the ports of a switch (Figure 30). The 
relevant data is parsed with additional script, parse_stats.sh. Output file is all_ports.stats_$date. 
Parse_stats.sh script (below Figure 31) requires a port as parameter to parse correct port statistics. 
Output filename of get_stats.sh is given as a parameter and also the port which the statistics are 
gone thru in detail, LOCAL or numerical port. 
  
Figure 30. Statistics collection script. 
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Appendix 3. Ovs-ofcli command output for port statistics and network 
capture    comparison 
 
 
  
Figure 31. parse_stats.sh script. 
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Appendix 4. Ovs-ofcli port statistics command capture, request packet, 1st 
query. 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol Length Info 
    141 12.011973000   172.16.0.15           172.16.0.104          OpenFlow 90     Type: 
OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST, OFPMP_PORT_STATS 
 
Frame 141: 90 bytes on wire (720 bits), 90 bytes captured (720 bits) on interface 0 
    Interface id: 0 (eth0) 
    Encapsulation type: Ethernet (1) 
    Arrival Time: Oct 21, 2016 11:02:22.298288000 EEST 
    [Time shift for this packet: 0.000000000 seconds] 
    Epoch Time: 1477036942.298288000 seconds 
    [Time delta from previous captured frame: 0.003754000 seconds] 
    [Time delta from previous displayed frame: 0.003754000 seconds] 
    [Time since reference or first frame: 12.011973000 seconds] 
    Frame Number: 141 
    Frame Length: 90 bytes (720 bits) 
    Capture Length: 90 bytes (720 bits) 
    [Frame is marked: False] 
    [Frame is ignored: False] 
    [Protocols in frame: eth:ethertype:ip:tcp:openflow:openflow_v4] 
    [Coloring Rule Name: TCP] 
    [Coloring Rule String: tcp] 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
    Destination: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
        Address: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
        .... ..0. .... .... .... .... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default) 
        .... ...0 .... .... .... .... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast) 
    Source: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
        Address: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
        Address: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
        .... ..0. .... .... .... .... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default) 
        .... ...0 .... .... .... .... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast) 
    Type: IP (0x0800) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15 (172.16.0.15), Dst: 172.16.0.104 (172.16.0.104) 
    Version: 4 
    Header Length: 20 bytes 
    Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00: Not-ECT (Not ECN-Capable 
Transport)) 
        0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00) 
        .... ..00 = Explicit Congestion Notification: Not-ECT (Not ECN-Capable Transport) (0x00) 
    Total Length: 76 
    Identification: 0x4261 (16993) 
    Flags: 0x02 (Don't Fragment) 
        0... .... = Reserved bit: Not set 
        .1.. .... = Don't fragment: Set 
        ..0. .... = More fragments: Not set 
    Fragment offset: 0 
    Time to live: 64 
    Protocol: TCP (6) 
    Header checksum: 0x9fb3 [validation disabled] 
        [Good: False] 
        [Bad: False] 
 Source: 172.16.0.15 (172.16.0.15) 
    Destination: 172.16.0.104 (172.16.0.104) 
    [Source GeoIP: Unknown] 
    [Destination GeoIP: Unknown] 
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Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633 (6633), Dst Port: 44823 (44823), Seq: 2014, Ack: 31321, 
Len: 24 
    Source Port: 6633 (6633) 
    Destination Port: 44823 (44823) 
    [Stream index: 0] 
    [TCP Segment Len: 24] 
    Sequence number: 2014    (relative sequence number) 
    [Next sequence number: 2038    (relative sequence number)] 
    Acknowledgment number: 31321    (relative ack number) 
    Header Length: 32 bytes 
    .... 0000 0001 1000 = Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK) 
        000. .... .... = Reserved: Not set 
        ...0 .... .... = Nonce: Not set 
        .... 0... .... = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR): Not set 
        .... .0.. .... = ECN-Echo: Not set 
        .... ..0. .... = Urgent: Not set 
        .... ...1 .... = Acknowledgment: Set 
        .... .... 1... = Push: Set 
        .... .... .0.. = Reset: Not set 
        .... .... ..0. = Syn: Not set 
        .... .... ...0 = Fin: Not set 
    Window size value: 1452 
    [Calculated window size: 1452] 
    [Window size scaling factor: -1 (unknown)] 
 Checksum: 0xd8df [validation disabled] 
        [Good Checksum: False] 
        [Bad Checksum: False] 
    Urgent pointer: 0 
    Options: (12 bytes), No-Operation (NOP), No-Operation (NOP), Timestamps 
        No-Operation (NOP) 
            Type: 1 
                0... .... = Copy on fragmentation: No 
                .00. .... = Class: Control (0) 
                ...0 0001 = Number: No-Operation (NOP) (1) 
        No-Operation (NOP) 
            Type: 1 
                0... .... = Copy on fragmentation: No 
                .00. .... = Class: Control (0) 
                ...0 0001 = Number: No-Operation (NOP) (1) 
        Timestamps: TSval 360922630, TSecr 1120897422 
            Kind: Time Stamp Option (8) 
            Length: 10 
            Timestamp value: 360922630 
            Timestamp echo reply: 1120897422 
    [SEQ/ACK analysis] 
        [Bytes in flight: 24] 
OpenFlow 1.3 
    Version: 1.3 (0x04) 
    Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST (18) 
    Length: 24 
    Transaction ID: 4256107 
    Type: OFPMP_PORT_STATS (4) 
Flags: 0x0000 
        .... .... .... ...0 = OFPMPF_REQ_MORE: 0x0000 
    Pad: 00000000 
    Port number: OFPP_ANY (0xffffffff) 
    Pad: 00000000 
                                                     
81 
 
 
Appendix 5. Ovs-ofcli statistics command capture, reply packet, 1st query. 
The output of statistics command 1st query is in text, in subchapter 4.4.2 Statistics Packets 
Identification. 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol Length Info 
    142 12.012147000   172.16.0.104          172.16.0.15           OpenFlow 754    Type: 
OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_PORT_STATS 
 
Frame 142: 754 bytes on wire (6032 bits), 754 bytes captured (6032 bits) on interface 0 
    Interface id: 0 (eth0) 
    Encapsulation type: Ethernet (1) 
    Arrival Time: Oct 21, 2016 11:02:22.298462000 EEST 
    [Time shift for this packet: 0.000000000 seconds] 
    Epoch Time: 1477036942.298462000 seconds 
    [Time delta from previous captured frame: 0.000174000 seconds] 
    [Time delta from previous displayed frame: 0.000174000 seconds] 
    [Time since reference or first frame: 12.012147000 seconds] 
    Frame Number: 142 
    Frame Length: 754 bytes (6032 bits) 
    Capture Length: 754 bytes (6032 bits) 
    [Frame is marked: False] 
    [Frame is ignored: False] 
    [Protocols in frame: eth:ethertype:ip:tcp:openflow:openflow_v4] 
    [Coloring Rule Name: TCP] 
    [Coloring Rule String: tcp] 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
    Destination: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
        Address: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
        .... ..0. .... .... .... .... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default) 
        .... ...0 .... .... .... .... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast) 
    Source: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
        Address: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
        .... ..0. .... .... .... .... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default) 
        .... ...0 .... .... .... .... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast) 
    Type: IP (0x0800) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104 (172.16.0.104), Dst: 172.16.0.15 (172.16.0.15) 
    Version: 4 
    Header Length: 20 bytes 
    Differentiated Services Field: 0xc0 (DSCP 0x30: Class Selector 6; ECN: 0x00: Not-ECT (Not ECN-
Capable Transport)) 
        1100 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Class Selector 6 (0x30) 
        .... ..00 = Explicit Congestion Notification: Not-ECT (Not ECN-Capable Transport) (0x00) 
    Total Length: 740 
    Identification: 0x5e21 (24097) 
    Flags: 0x02 (Don't Fragment) 
        0... .... = Reserved bit: Not set 
        .1.. .... = Don't fragment: Set 
        ..0. .... = More fragments: Not set 
    Fragment offset: 0 
    Time to live: 64 
    Protocol: TCP (6) 
    Header checksum: 0x809b [validation disabled] 
 [Good: False] 
        [Bad: False] 
    Source: 172.16.0.104 (172.16.0.104) 
    Destination: 172.16.0.15 (172.16.0.15) 
    [Source GeoIP: Unknown] 
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    [Destination GeoIP: Unknown] 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823 (44823), Dst Port: 6633 (6633), Seq: 31321, Ack: 2038, 
Len: 688 
    Source Port: 44823 (44823) 
    Destination Port: 6633 (6633) 
    [Stream index: 0] 
    [TCP Segment Len: 688] 
    Sequence number: 31321    (relative sequence number) 
    [Next sequence number: 32009    (relative sequence number)] 
    Acknowledgment number: 2038    (relative ack number) 
    Header Length: 32 bytes 
    .... 0000 0001 1000 = Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK) 
        000. .... .... = Reserved: Not set 
        ...0 .... .... = Nonce: Not set 
        .... 0... .... = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR): Not set 
        .... .0.. .... = ECN-Echo: Not set 
        .... ..0. .... = Urgent: Not set 
        .... ...1 .... = Acknowledgment: Set 
        .... .... 1... = Push: Set 
        .... .... .0.. = Reset: Not set 
        .... .... ..0. = Syn: Not set 
        .... .... ...0 = Fin: Not set 
    Window size value: 1444 
 [Calculated window size: 1444] 
    [Window size scaling factor: -1 (unknown)] 
    Checksum: 0x5b6e [validation disabled] 
        [Good Checksum: False] 
        [Bad Checksum: False] 
    Urgent pointer: 0 
    Options: (12 bytes), No-Operation (NOP), No-Operation (NOP), Timestamps 
        No-Operation (NOP) 
            Type: 1 
                0... .... = Copy on fragmentation: No 
                .00. .... = Class: Control (0) 
                ...0 0001 = Number: No-Operation (NOP) (1) 
        No-Operation (NOP) 
            Type: 1 
                0... .... = Copy on fragmentation: No 
                .00. .... = Class: Control (0) 
                ...0 0001 = Number: No-Operation (NOP) (1) 
        Timestamps: TSval 1120897423, TSecr 360922630 
            Kind: Time Stamp Option (8) 
            Length: 10 
            Timestamp value: 1120897423 
            Timestamp echo reply: 360922630 
    [SEQ/ACK analysis] 
        [This is an ACK to the segment in frame: 141] 
        [The RTT to ACK the segment was: 0.000174000 seconds] 
        [Bytes in flight: 688] 
OpenFlow 1.3 
    Version: 1.3 (0x04) 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY (19) 
    Length: 688 
    Transaction ID: 4256107 
    Type: OFPMP_PORT_STATS (4) 
    Flags: 0x0000 
        .... .... .... ...0 = OFPMPF_REQ_MORE: 0x0000 
    Pad: 00000000 
    Port stats 
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        Port number: 1 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 219291 
        Tx packets: 2700354 
        Rx bytes: 13157858 
        Tx bytes: 269878766 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4483885 
        Duration nsec: 264000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 4 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 0 
 Rx bytes: 0 
        Tx bytes: 0 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4483885 
        Duration nsec: 266000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: OFPP_LOCAL (0xfffffffe) 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 0 
        Tx packets: 186969 
        Rx bytes: 0 
        Tx bytes: 14271122 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4483885 
Duration nsec: 266000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 2 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 1651314 
        Tx packets: 2175463 
        Rx bytes: 226726052 
        Tx bytes: 157647204 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
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        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4483885 
        Duration nsec: 265000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 5 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 1069070 
        Tx packets: 1994064 
        Rx bytes: 65274537 
        Tx bytes: 226454603 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
 Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4483885 
        Duration nsec: 269000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 3 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 0 
        Tx packets: 0 
        Rx bytes: 0 
        Tx bytes: 0 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4483885 
        Duration nsec: 265000000 
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Appendix 6. Ovs-ofcli port statistics command output, 2nd query. 
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Appendix 7. Ovs-ofcli port statistics command capture, 2nd query. 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol Length Info 
    160 15.511742000   172.16.0.104          172.16.0.15           OpenFlow 754    Type: 
OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_PORT_STATS 
 
Packet comments 
Frame 160: 754 bytes on wire (6032 bits), 754 bytes captured (6032 bits) on interface 0 
    Interface id: 0 (eth0) 
    Encapsulation type: Ethernet (1) 
    Arrival Time: Oct 24, 2016 10:34:07.652404000 EEST 
    [Time shift for this packet: 0.000000000 seconds] 
    Epoch Time: 1477294447.652404000 seconds 
    [Time delta from previous captured frame: 0.000171000 seconds] 
    [Time delta from previous displayed frame: 0.000171000 seconds] 
    [Time since reference or first frame: 15.511742000 seconds] 
    Frame Number: 160 
    Frame Length: 754 bytes (6032 bits) 
    Capture Length: 754 bytes (6032 bits) 
    [Frame is marked: False] 
    [Frame is ignored: False] 
    [Protocols in frame: eth:ethertype:ip:tcp:openflow:openflow_v4] 
    [Coloring Rule Name: TCP] 
    [Coloring Rule String: tcp] 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
    Destination: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
        Address: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
        .... ..0. .... .... .... .... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default) 
        .... ...0 .... .... .... .... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast) 
    Source: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Source: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
        Address: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
        .... ..0. .... .... .... .... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default) 
        .... ...0 .... .... .... .... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast) 
    Type: IP (0x0800) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104 (172.16.0.104), Dst: 172.16.0.15 (172.16.0.15) 
    Version: 4 
    Header Length: 20 bytes 
    Differentiated Services Field: 0xc0 (DSCP 0x30: Class Selector 6; ECN: 0x00: Not-ECT (Not ECN-
Capable Transport)) 
        1100 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Class Selector 6 (0x30) 
        .... ..00 = Explicit Congestion Notification: Not-ECT (Not ECN-Capable Transport) (0x00) 
    Total Length: 740 
    Identification: 0xeae3 (60131) 
    Flags: 0x02 (Don't Fragment) 
        0... .... = Reserved bit: Not set 
        .1.. .... = Don't fragment: Set 
        ..0. .... = More fragments: Not set 
    Fragment offset: 0 
    Time to live: 64 
    Protocol: TCP (6) 
    Header checksum: 0xf3d8 [validation disabled] 
        [Good: False] 
        [Bad: False] 
    Source: 172.16.0.104 (172.16.0.104) 
    Destination: 172.16.0.15 (172.16.0.15) 
    [Source GeoIP: Unknown] 
 [Destination GeoIP: Unknown] 
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Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823 (44823), Dst Port: 6633 (6633), Seq: 38961, Ack: 2621, 
Len: 688 
    Source Port: 44823 (44823) 
    Destination Port: 6633 (6633) 
    [Stream index: 0] 
    [TCP Segment Len: 688] 
    Sequence number: 38961    (relative sequence number) 
    [Next sequence number: 39649    (relative sequence number)] 
    Acknowledgment number: 2621    (relative ack number) 
    Header Length: 32 bytes 
    .... 0000 0001 1000 = Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK) 
        000. .... .... = Reserved: Not set 
        ...0 .... .... = Nonce: Not set 
        .... 0... .... = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR): Not set 
        .... .0.. .... = ECN-Echo: Not set 
        .... ..0. .... = Urgent: Not set 
        .... ...1 .... = Acknowledgment: Set 
        .... .... 1... = Push: Set 
        .... .... .0.. = Reset: Not set 
        .... .... ..0. = Syn: Not set 
        .... .... ...0 = Fin: Not set 
    Window size value: 1444 
    [Calculated window size: 1444] 
    [Window size scaling factor: -1 (unknown)] 
    Checksum: 0x5b6e [validation disabled] 
        [Good Checksum: False] 
        [Bad Checksum: False] 
 Urgent pointer: 0 
    Options: (12 bytes), No-Operation (NOP), No-Operation (NOP), Timestamps 
        No-Operation (NOP) 
            Type: 1 
                0... .... = Copy on fragmentation: No 
                .00. .... = Class: Control (0) 
                ...0 0001 = Number: No-Operation (NOP) (1) 
        No-Operation (NOP) 
            Type: 1 
                0... .... = Copy on fragmentation: No 
                .00. .... = Class: Control (0) 
                ...0 0001 = Number: No-Operation (NOP) (1) 
        Timestamps: TSval 1185273762, TSecr 425298935 
            Kind: Time Stamp Option (8) 
            Length: 10 
            Timestamp value: 1185273762 
            Timestamp echo reply: 425298935 
    [SEQ/ACK analysis] 
        [This is an ACK to the segment in frame: 159] 
        [The RTT to ACK the segment was: 0.000171000 seconds] 
        [Bytes in flight: 688] 
OpenFlow 1.3 
    Version: 1.3 (0x04) 
    Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY (19) 
    Length: 688 
    Transaction ID: 5097194 
    Type: OFPMP_PORT_STATS (4) 
    Flags: 0x0000 
      .... .... .... ...0 = OFPMPF_REQ_MORE: 0x0000 
    Pad: 00000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 1 
88 
 
 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 231849 
        Tx packets: 2835566 
        Rx bytes: 13911338 
        Tx bytes: 287013405 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4741390 
        Duration nsec: 618000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 4 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 0 
       Tx packets: 0 
        Rx bytes: 0 
        Tx bytes: 0 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4741390 
        Duration nsec: 620000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: OFPP_LOCAL (0xfffffffe) 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 0 
        Tx packets: 186969 
        Rx bytes: 0 
        Tx bytes: 14271122 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4741390 
        Duration nsec: 620000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 2 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 1728909 
        Tx packets: 2245638 
        Rx bytes: 239012154 
        Tx bytes: 163249221 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
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        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4741390 
        Duration nsec: 619000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 5 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 1075186 
        Tx packets: 2135718 
        Rx bytes: 65745489 
 Tx bytes: 243871770 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4741390 
        Duration nsec: 623000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 3 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 0 
        Tx packets: 0 
        Rx bytes: 0 
        Tx bytes: 0 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4741390 
        Duration nsec: 619000000 
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Appendix 8. DLUX UI port statistics command reply capture, 3rd query. 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol Length Info 
    288 36.678984000   172.16.0.104          172.16.0.15           OpenFlow 754    Type: 
OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_PORT_STATS 
 
Frame 288: 754 bytes on wire (6032 bits), 754 bytes captured (6032 bits) on interface 0 
    Interface id: 0 (eth0) 
    Encapsulation type: Ethernet (1) 
    Arrival Time: Oct 25, 2016 09:20:48.863171000 EEST 
    [Time shift for this packet: 0.000000000 seconds] 
    Epoch Time: 1477376448.863171000 seconds 
    [Time delta from previous captured frame: 0.000220000 seconds] 
    [Time delta from previous displayed frame: 0.000220000 seconds] 
    [Time since reference or first frame: 36.678984000 seconds] 
    Frame Number: 288 
    Frame Length: 754 bytes (6032 bits) 
    Capture Length: 754 bytes (6032 bits) 
    [Frame is marked: False] 
    [Frame is ignored: False] 
    [Protocols in frame: eth:ethertype:ip:tcp:openflow:openflow_v4] 
    [Coloring Rule Name: TCP] 
    [Coloring Rule String: tcp] 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
    Destination: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
        Address: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
        .... ..0. .... .... .... .... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default) 
        .... ...0 .... .... .... .... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast) 
    Source: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
        Address: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
        .... ..0. .... .... .... .... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default) 
        .... ...0 .... .... .... .... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast) 
    Type: IP (0x0800) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104 (172.16.0.104), Dst: 172.16.0.15 (172.16.0.15) 
    Version: 4 
    Header Length: 20 bytes 
    Differentiated Services Field: 0xc0 (DSCP 0x30: Class Selector 6; ECN: 0x00: Not-ECT (Not ECN-
Capable Transport)) 
       1100 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Class Selector 6 (0x30) 
        .... ..00 = Explicit Congestion Notification: Not-ECT (Not ECN-Capable Transport) (0x00) 
    Total Length: 740 
    Identification: 0x8082 (32898) 
    Flags: 0x02 (Don't Fragment) 
        0... .... = Reserved bit: Not set 
        .1.. .... = Don't fragment: Set 
        ..0. .... = More fragments: Not set 
    Fragment offset: 0 
    Time to live: 64 
    Protocol: TCP (6) 
    Header checksum: 0x5e3a [validation disabled] 
        [Good: False] 
        [Bad: False] 
    Source: 172.16.0.104 (172.16.0.104) 
    Destination: 172.16.0.15 (172.16.0.15) 
    [Source GeoIP: Unknown] 
    [Destination GeoIP: Unknown] 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823 (44823), Dst Port: 6633 (6633), Seq: 92441, Ack: 5577, 
Len: 688 
    Source Port: 44823 (44823) 
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    Destination Port: 6633 (6633) 
    [Stream index: 0] 
    [TCP Segment Len: 688] 
    Sequence number: 92441    (relative sequence number) 
    [Next sequence number: 93129    (relative sequence number)] 
    Acknowledgment number: 5577    (relative ack number) 
    Header Length: 32 bytes 
    .... 0000 0001 1000 = Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK) 
        000. .... .... = Reserved: Not set 
        ...0 .... .... = Nonce: Not set 
        .... 0... .... = Congestion Window Reduced (CWR): Not set 
        .... .0.. .... = ECN-Echo: Not set 
        .... ..0. .... = Urgent: Not set 
        .... ...1 .... = Acknowledgment: Set 
       .... .... 1... = Push: Set 
        .... .... .0.. = Reset: Not set 
        .... .... ..0. = Syn: Not set 
        .... .... ...0 = Fin: Not set 
    Window size value: 1444 
    [Calculated window size: 1444] 
    [Window size scaling factor: -1 (unknown)] 
    Checksum: 0x5b6e [validation disabled] 
        [Good Checksum: False] 
        [Bad Checksum: False] 
    Urgent pointer: 0 
    Options: (12 bytes), No-Operation (NOP), No-Operation (NOP), Timestamps 
        No-Operation (NOP) 
            Type: 1 
                0... .... = Copy on fragmentation: No 
                .00. .... = Class: Control (0) 
                ...0 0001 = Number: No-Operation (NOP) (1) 
        No-Operation (NOP) 
            Type: 1 
                0... .... = Copy on fragmentation: No 
                .00. .... = Class: Control (0) 
                ...0 0001 = Number: No-Operation (NOP) (1) 
        Timestamps: TSval 1205774065, TSecr 445799227 
            Kind: Time Stamp Option (8) 
            Length: 10 
            Timestamp value: 1205774065 
            Timestamp echo reply: 445799227 
    [SEQ/ACK analysis] 
        [This is an ACK to the segment in frame: 287] 
        [The RTT to ACK the segment was: 0.000220000 seconds] 
        [Bytes in flight: 688] 
OpenFlow 1.3 
    Version: 1.3 (0x04) 
    Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY (19) 
    Length: 688 
    Transaction ID: 5365034 
                                                                      
Type: OFPMP_PORT_STATS (4) 
    Flags: 0x0000 
        .... .... .... ...0 = OFPMPF_REQ_MORE: 0x0000 
    Pad: 00000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 1 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 235851 
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        Tx packets: 2878309 
        Rx bytes: 14151458 
        Tx bytes: 292408489 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4823391 
        Duration nsec: 829000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 4 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 0 
        Tx packets: 0 
        Rx bytes: 0 
        Tx bytes: 0 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
Duration sec: 4823391 
        Duration nsec: 831000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: OFPP_LOCAL (0xfffffffe) 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 0 
        Tx packets: 186969 
        Rx bytes: 0 
        Tx bytes: 14271122 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4823391 
        Duration nsec: 831000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 2 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 1753421 
        Tx packets: 2267871 
        Rx bytes: 242874088 
        Tx bytes: 165022491 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
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        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4823391 
        Duration nsec: 830000000 
Port stats 
        Port number: 5 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 1077017 
        Tx packets: 2180632 
        Rx bytes: 65884639 
        Tx bytes: 249367824 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4823391 
        Duration nsec: 834000000 
    Port stats 
        Port number: 3 
        Pad: 00000000 
        Rx packets: 0 
        Tx packets: 0 
        Rx bytes: 0 
        Tx bytes: 0 
        Rx dropped: 0 
        Tx dropped: 0 
        Rx errors: 0 
        Tx errors: 0 
        Rx frame errors: 0 
        Rx overrun errors: 0 
        Rx CRC errors: 0 
        Collisions: 0 
        Duration sec: 4823391 
        Duration nsec: 830000000 
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Appendix 9. Network capture during statistics query via DLUX UI, 3rd query. 
Here is a clip from the 30-page packet capture output to show the format of flow related 
packets, OFPMP -packets sample. 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
14       0.674914  172.16.0.15        172.16.0.104          TCP       66      
Info  
6633 → 44823 [ACK] Seq=496 Ack=7257 Win=1432 Len=0 TSval=445790226 TSecr=1205765063 
 
Frame 14: 66 bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 496, Ack: 7257, Len: 0 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
15       0.674923   172.16.0.104     172.16.0.15           OpenFlow  386     
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_TABLE 
 
Frame 15: 386 bytes on wire (3088 bits), 386 bytes captured (3088 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104, Dst: 172.16.0.15 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823, Dst Port: 6633, Seq: 7257, Ack: 496, Len: 320 
[3 Reassembled TCP Segments (6112 bytes): #12(2896), #13(2896), #15(320)] 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length  
16       0.681838    172.16.0.15      172.16.0.104          OpenFlow  82      
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST, OFPMP_GROUP_DESC 
 
Frame 16: 82 bytes on wire (656 bits), 82 bytes captured (656 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 496, Ack: 7577, Len: 16 
OpenFlow 1.3 
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No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
17       0.681884   172.16.0.104     172.16.0.15           OpenFlow  82      
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_GROUP_DESC 
 
Frame 17: 82 bytes on wire (656 bits), 82 bytes captured (656 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104, Dst: 172.16.0.15 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823, Dst Port: 6633, Seq: 7577, Ack: 512, Len: 16 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
18       0.688011   172.16.0.15        172.16.0.104         OpenFlow  90      
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST, OFPMP_GROUP 
 
Frame 18: 90 bytes on wire (720 bits), 90 bytes captured (720 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 512, Ack: 7593, Len: 24 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
19       0.688053    172.16.0.104     172.16.0.15          OpenFlow  82      
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_GROUP 
 
Frame 19: 82 bytes on wire (656 bits), 82 bytes captured (656 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104, Dst: 172.16.0.15 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823, Dst Port: 6633, Seq: 7593, Ack: 536, Len: 16 
OpenFlow 1.3 
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No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
20       0.688841    172.16.0.15      172.16.0.104          OpenFlow  90      
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST, OFPMP_METER_CONFIG 
 
Frame 20: 90 bytes on wire (720 bits), 90 bytes captured (720 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 536, Ack: 7609, Len: 24 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
21       0.688881    172.16.0.104     172.16.0.15          OpenFlow  82      
 
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_METER_CONFIG 
 
Frame 21: 82 bytes on wire (656 bits), 82 bytes captured (656 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104, Dst: 172.16.0.15 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823, Dst Port: 6633, Seq: 7609, Ack: 560, Len: 16 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
22       0.689692    172.16.0.15       172.16.0.104        OpenFlow  90      
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST, OFPMP_METER 
 
Frame 22: 90 bytes on wire (720 bits), 90 bytes captured (720 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 560, Ack: 7625, Len: 24 
OpenFlow 1.3 
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No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
23       0.689746   172.16.0.104     172.16.0.15           OpenFlow  82      
Info  
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_METER 
 
Frame 23: 82 bytes on wire (656 bits), 82 bytes captured (656 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104, Dst: 172.16.0.15 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823, Dst Port: 6633, Seq: 7625, Ack: 584, Len: 16 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length  
24       0.726402   172.16.0.15       172.16.0.104         TCP       66      
Info 
6633 → 44823 [ACK] Seq=584 Ack=7641 Win=1452 Len=0 TSval=445790239 TSecr=1205765067 
 
Frame 24: 66 bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 584, Ack: 7641, Len: 0 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
25       3.674709   172.16.0.15        172.16.0.104        OpenFlow  122     
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST, OFPMP_FLOW 
 
Frame 25: 122 bytes on wire (976 bits), 122 bytes captured (976 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 584, Ack: 7641, Len: 56 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
26       3.674845   172.16.0.104     172.16.0.15           OpenFlow  826     
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_FLOW 
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Frame 26: 826 bytes on wire (6608 bits), 826 bytes captured (6608 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104, Dst: 172.16.0.15 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823, Dst Port: 6633, Seq: 7641, Ack: 640, Len: 760 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
27       3.674978   172.16.0.15        172.16.0.104        TCP       66      
Info 
6633 → 44823 [ACK] Seq=640 Ack=8401 Win=1452 Len=0 TSval=445790976 TSecr=1205765814 
 
Frame 27: 66 bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 640, Ack: 8401, Len: 0 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
28       3.677495   172.16.0.15        172.16.0.104         OpenFlow 90      
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST, OFPMP_PORT_STATS 
 
Frame 28: 90 bytes on wire (720 bits), 90 bytes captured (720 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 640, Ack: 8401, Len: 24 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
29       3.677652   172.16.0.104      172.16.0.15          OpenFlow  754     
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_PORT_STATS 
 
Frame 29: 754 bytes on wire (6032 bits), 754 bytes captured (6032 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104, Dst: 172.16.0.15 
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Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823, Dst Port: 6633, Seq: 8401, Ack: 664, Len: 688 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
30       3.679190   172.16.0.15        172.16.0.104         OpenFlow  90      
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST, OFPMP_QUEUE 
 
Frame 30: 90 bytes on wire (720 bits), 90 bytes captured (720 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 664, Ack: 9089, Len: 24 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
31       3.679232   172.16.0.104      172.16.0.15          OpenFlow  82      
Info 
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REPLY, OFPMP_QUEUE 
 
Frame 31: 82 bytes on wire (656 bits), 82 bytes captured (656 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d), Dst: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.104, Dst: 172.16.0.15 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 44823, Dst Port: 6633, Seq: 9089, Ack: 688, Len: 16 
OpenFlow 1.3 
 
No.     Time           Source                Destination           Protocol  Length 
32       3.680218    172.16.0.15       172.16.0.104         OpenFlow  82      
Info  
Type: OFPT_MULTIPART_REQUEST, OFPMP_TABLE 
 
Frame 32: 82 bytes on wire (656 bits), 82 bytes captured (656 bits) on interface 0 
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_01:22:4a (00:50:56:01:22:4a), Dst: Vmware_01:1b:3d (00:50:56:01:1b:3d) 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.0.15, Dst: 172.16.0.104 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 6633, Dst Port: 44823, Seq: 688, Ack: 9105, Len: 16 
OpenFlow 1.3 
